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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about America’s federal legal system’s regulation of the
police power in a democracy structured to share that power between a
national government and the states that are its members. This Article is
context and time-interval-specific. The research this Article reflects focuses
on identifying pertinent decisions by state supreme courts from 2000–2020.
Its multiple research hypotheses define pertinence. The principal
hypothesis is: the nation’s state supreme courts were, much more so than
the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS), during the researchstudy period, the primary guardians against “flagrant” unconstitutional
Government Investigative Techniques (GIT).
In perspective, this Article examines the context of the issues implicated
by the policies underlying the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines the degree
to which “progress” has occurred in fulfilling Justice William Brennan’s
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aspiration for state supreme courts to play a strong, independent role in
safeguarding the rights reflected in the national and state constitutions.1
The GITs studied arguably violated rights found in the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments of the Constitution and comparable rights in state
constitutions. A subtext hypothesis of this Article is: a state supreme court
is more likely to hold that exclusion is constitutionally required when it
places reliance only on their state’s constitution.
The study examines the series of doctrines that account for the ultimate
outcome articulated in the principal hypothesis. The study begins with the
baseline—an analysis of important SCOTUS decisions and the Court’s
analysis of the Fruits and the Attenuation Doctrines, specifically looking at
the identification and evaluation of the interests served and resolutions they
portend.2 Part One also includes a discussion of how this Article qualified
and disqualified state supreme court decisions for inclusion in this study.3
Part Two examines a crucial related procedural issue: the allocation of the
burdens of production and persuasion when the defendant claims that the
violation of one or more of these rights requires exclusion of the evidence
at issue.4 Part Three begins by examining whether the state supreme courts
are more likely to require exclusion because they are more inclined than
SCOTUS to find an initial constitutional violation.5 Next, Part Three
evaluates whether the state supreme courts are also more likely than
SCOTUS to hold evidence at issue seized subsequent to the initial
unconstitutional GIT, usually as a result of a subsequent GIT (even if not
an independent unconstitutional GIT), must also be excluded because it is
fairly found to be a product of the initial unconstitutional GIT; the so-called
“Fruit of the Poisonous Tree.”6
This final section of Part Three discusses the policy significance of the
difference in outcomes, especially in the context of the primary hypothesis

1. See William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 502–04 (1977) (asserting state supreme courts should scrutinize constitutional decisions by
federal courts in their role of expanding constitutional protections and safeguarding the rights of the
people of this nation). But see James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 761, 817–18 (1992) (asserting a less optimistic view of state constitutions and the ability of
state supreme courts to make principled decisions based on their state constitutions).
2. See infra notes 16–59 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 64–81 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 86–108 and accompanying text.
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of this study.7 Part Three concludes by identifying and assessing the
significance of the difference in outcomes between SCOTUS and the state
supreme courts. Proof is presented that a number of these state supreme
courts expressly based their Fruits Doctrine decisions on their state
constitutions.8 Part Four examines whether state supreme courts are also
more likely than SCOTUS to hold evidence at issue should be excluded
because the Attenuation Doctrine does not justify excusing the exclusion.9
In its final part, Part Five, this Article focuses first on the findings and
conclusions that should be drawn from the study of the cases identified in
the first four parts.10 Part Five continues by identifying the most important
implications and recommendations that should be drawn from the study.11
The crucial recommendation is presumptively making the “flagrancy” of the
government’s unconstitutional course of conduct the sole inquiry for
resolving the competing interests implicated by the Fruits and Attenuation
Doctrines.12 This section of Part Five next examines whether and when
the resolution of these competing interests—to determine if exclusion is
justified—needs to also consider the other two concepts currently used in
these evaluations by SCOTUS and the state supreme courts—temporal
proximity, and intervening events and conduct.13 Finally, Part Five
provides overall perspectives to be drawn from this Article, including how
its major proposal might impact the significance of the Independent
Source—and its hypothetical iteration, the Inevitable Discovery
Doctrines.14

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra notes 104 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 109–156 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 157–205 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 206–227 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 206–227 and accompanying text.
See infra text discussion between notes 206 and 210 and accompanying text.
See infra note 228–243 and accompanying text.
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I. SCOTUS AND ITS EVOLUTION OF THE FRUITS
AND ATTENUATION DOCTRINES: AN INTEREST ANALYSIS INCLUDING
INITIAL FLAGGING OF THE ROLE OF RACE AND CASTE &
DEFINING THE PARAMETERS FOR INCLUSION OF
STATE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN THE STUDY
Wong Sun15 remains, and appropriately so, the anchor SCOTUS decision
employed to identify and evaluate the interests reflected in the Fruits and
Attenuation Doctrines.16
First, the facts reflect multiple “Primary Taints,” distinct, and sequential
unconstitutional government investigatory techniques employed against
three different minority men.17 The fact that all three men were members
of a minority racial group cannot be ignored because it stands as a harbinger
of the same circumstantial context in which these doctrines and their interest
identification and evaluations have played out through the decades until
2020.18
In Wong Sun, there was an unconstitutional home invasion, followed by
an unconstitutional search, followed by an unconstitutional seizure—the
arrest without probable cause of the first man, Toy.19 This was followed
by an unconstitutional search of the home of the second man, Yee, without
probable cause.20 The officers soon thereafter repeated this sequence of
unconstitutional investigative techniques—entering the home of the third
man without a warrant, searching without probable cause, and subsequently,
unconstitutionally seizing the third man, Wong Sun.21
Having identified a series of primary taints, the Court turned to defining
and applying the Fruits Doctrine to determine whether some of the
15. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
16. See id. at 484–88 (articulating the Court’s analysis of the interests furthered by the Fruit and
Attenuation Doctrines).
17. See id. at 473–75 (detailing the events that led to the arraignment of Yee, Toy, and Wong
Sun).
18. See infra notes 89, 126, 132–33, 141, 205, 209, and 217 and accompanying text.
19. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 474 (describing how Agent Wong broke into Toy’s home, searched
the premises for narcotics, and placed Toy under arrest even though no narcotics were found in the
home). Today, post-Miranda and its progeny, another such unconstitutional act would have followed
this course of unconstitutional conduct—an interrogation without any warnings. See generally Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (highlighting the right of individuals to be aware of their rights prior
to interrogation).
20. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 474–75 (detailing the identification of and entry into Yee’s home
that led to Yee surrendering the heroin he had in his home).
21. See id. at 475 (recounting the night where Alton Wong and six other officers entered Wong
Sun’s apartment, brought him from his bedroom in handcuffs, and thoroughly searched his apartment).
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statements made by Toy and Wong Sun should be excluded.22 In one
paragraph, the Court set out the core sequential elements of the Fruits
Doctrine, which have framed this issue in our nation’s high courts for the
last fifty-seven years.23
The scope and significance of the collective taint resulting from the
course of “lawless” government conduct, however, was not precisely
defined in the opinion.24 The fact that the lawless conduct was a “but for”
cause of the subsequent opportunity to seize or hear the evidence at issue
was found not to be enough linkage to justify exclusion of that evidence as
the fruit of the illegality and the Court has adhered to that position.25
More was required. But what “more” was enough to establish the
necessary nexus between the taint(s) and evidence at issue was colorfully
described, but not well defined. The standards can be restated as a search
for whether the evidence at issue was obtained by the exploitation of the
illegal conduct—and the degree of that exploitation—or by means that
would allow the evidence to be sufficiently “purged” of the taint, such as
knowledge from separate legal sources or intervening circumstances.26
No definition of “purge,” or “taint,” or “intervening circumstances” was
developed.27 More importantly, despite the obvious opportunity, the Court
did very little to detail and emphasize the significance of the multiple flagrant
and racist sequences of unconstitutional GITs. The failure to define the
increments and develop appropriate policy foundations for the Fruits
Doctrine risked subjectivity playing a significant role in future cases.
With respect to Toy’s inculpatory statements made in his home, the Court
concluded they were obtained during the government’s unconstitutional

22. See id. at 484–85 (determining the Fruits Doctrine is applicable to tangible and verbal
evidence through a review of prior caselaw).
23. See id. (reviewing the caselaw that guided the development of the Fruits Doctrine).
24. See id. at 487 (discussing the relationship between the lawless conduct of the police and the
evidence’s ability to be excluded without addressing the scope or significance the lawless conduct plays
in this determination).
25. Id. at 487–88. Almost all state supreme courts have held the same. See infra notes 37, 182,
and 230 and accompanying text.
26. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting JOHN MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
This Article will advocate for “probable cause” as the appropriate nexus. See infra note 206 and
accompanying text.
27. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486 (declaring it is unreasonable to infer that the evidence was
purged of its unreasonable taint but failing to define this terminology). But see Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975) (describing the trio of components of the Attenuation Doctrine, including
the presence of intervening circumstances, which is strikingly missing from the Wong Sun opinion).
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search and seizure and rejected the government’s claims that the statements
were admissible because they were voluntary.28
Once Toy’s statements in his home were excluded, the Court
concluded—without revisiting the “elements” of the Fruits Doctrine—that
the drugs seized shortly thereafter at Yee’s home must also be excluded as
fruit of the course of unconstitutional conduct.29 The opinion did not place
reliance upon the scope of the flagrancy of the government’s course of
unconstitutional conduct or that the conduct targeted members of a
minority group.
However, Wong Sun’s unsigned statement was not excluded. The Court
concluded that Wong Sun’s voluntary return to the station days later
removed the influence of the illegal arrest.30 The Court did not assess the
continuing effect and emotional distress the unconstitutional invasion and
search of his home would have had on Wong Sun.
The policy implications of this standard, and its strengths and weaknesses,
have echoed in the decisions of our highest court for the last six decades.
The Attenuation Doctrine’s evolution, for example, awaited subsequent
decisions by SCOTUS. The two key attenuations decisions are Brown v.
Illinois 31 and Utah v. Strieff.32
In Brown, the case also began with a series of unconstitutional police
investigative techniques which bore characteristics that justified each to be
appropriately categorized as flagrant, even if the Court did not.33 A team
of police officers, without a warrant and absent probable cause, broke into
the unoccupied home of a minority man and conducted an unconstitutional
search of the person’s effects.34 Thereafter, the officers occupied the home,
awaited the man’s return, and with guns drawn, arrested him as he entered
the apartment; all without probable cause or a warrant.35
The Court’s decision focused on an evaluation of whether the evidence
at issue, two sequential stationhouse confessions made within hours of the

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 491.
Brown, 422 U.S. at 591–96.
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
Brown, 422 U.S. at 593.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 593.
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arrest, should be declared the fruit of the unconstitutional arrest.36 The
Court again endorsed that “but for” is not enough of a nexus principle.37
To guide its decision, the Court referenced and adopted the trio of
Attenuation Doctrine elements identified in Wong Sun.38 Hence the
intervening fact principle was reconfirmed by the Court, but the Court
found there were no significant intervening events; somehow
compartmentalizing the series of Miranda warnings given Brown as a
separate consideration.39 This conceptual departure heightened the risk of
subjective outcomes and skewed policy guidance.
The Court held that Miranda warnings could not serve alone to per se
remove the taint of the illegal arrest because it invited a premeditated and
intentional resort to the warnings to excuse flagrant government
investigative violations of the Fourth Amendment.40 A policy position the
Court would eventually also adopt as the justification for barring
premeditated, purposeful violations of the Fifth Amendment rights the
Miranda warnings were crafted to protect.41
The Strieff majority held that the first two factors in the attenuation
evaluation—temporal proximity and intervening circumstances—split with
one strongly favoring the accused and the other strongly favoring the
government.42 On the third factor—the flagrancy of the course of
government’s unconstitutional conduct—which the majority acknowledged
was the most significant of the three—the Strieff majority simply politicized
the evaluation by resting the outcome on a subjective, untenable interest

36. Id. at 602–06.
37. Id. at 603.
38. See id. at 603–04 (referring to the temporal proximity of the initial arrest and defendant’s
subsequent confession, interfering circumstances, and the purpose and gravity of police misconduct)
(first citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972); then citing Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963)).
39. Id. at 604–05.
40. Id. at 602–603, 605 (first citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726–27(1969); then
quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)). A purposeful violation of the Fourth Amendment
would only benefit the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of the accused if the agents knew
they could thereafter take action that would excuse this unconstitutional course of conduct. It should
be noted that in the context of this analysis, the Court did indirectly recognize that such a course of
unjustified, serious incursions into the property and person of an accused, was possibly designed to
cause, and therefore, possibly could cause, fright. Id. at 605.
41. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 619–20 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 (1985)). See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
42. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016).
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reconciliation course of decision.43 Justice Thomas, writing for the
majority, effectively held that the government can accost any American
citizen, without even needing reasonable suspicion, when that citizen is a
pedestrian.44 The government can demand the person speak to the
government officer, turn over his identification, wait while the officer
determines if the citizen has an arrest warrant, and if the government gets
lucky, and a warrant exists, this course of completely unjustified
unconstitutional conduct is not flagrant, but only negligent.45
To characterize this officer’s unconstitutional course of conduct as “good
faith,” and to include a flagrant lie that the officer’s conduct after the initial
stop was legal, invites an authoritarian-style government to America. In the
minds of the justices, who signed on to the majority opinion, the
Constitution does not prevent the government from stopping any citizen
for any reason, including what the accused may look or sound like.46 This
Article will track the degree to which the nation’s state supreme courts have
found Justice Thomas’s reasoning persuasive in interpreting their state
constitutions.47
Other important SCOTUS decisions, properly viewed as contributing to
the evolution of the Court’s efforts to reconcile the interest reflected in the
Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines, include those in which the Court’s
primary opinion failed to expressly reference or employ the doctrines to
reach its decision.48 The substance of Seibert, however, mirrored Brown’s
interest analysis, and like Brown, concluded that exclusion was required
because the flagrancy of the government’s unconstitutional conduct
intentionally violated, in that case, the person’s Fifth Amendment

43. Id. at 2063.
44. Id. at 2064.
45. But see id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing the Court’s decision to uphold the
constitutionality of the stop because the existence of a warrant for a crime, often trivial in nature,
effectively attenuated the taint of evidence as unreasonable); Rebecca Laitman, Fourth Amendment
Flagrancy: What it is, and What it is Not, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 799, 801 (2018) (concluding the Court
failed to explain why it characterized the government’s conduct as non-flagrant and never attempted
to define flagrant).
46. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (holding the evidence seized from the defendant was admissible
and the defendant’s constitutional protections were not violated); see also infra notes 129–147 and
accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 129–149 and accompanying text.
48. See generally Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (plurality opinion) (failing to reference
the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines in deciding the holding).
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privilege.49 As in Brown, therefore, the opinion rejected Miranda warnings
as necessarily adequate to constitute a qualifying intervening act.50
Under the facts in Siebert, it was clear the policies underlying the Fruits
Doctrine versus those underlying the Attenuation Doctrine left no doubts
that the second confession was the product of the first confession given
only minutes earlier.51 Justice Breyer wrote his concurrence to make the
point that under the facts of Seibert, the principles and policies underlying
the Fruits Doctrine better-justified exclusion.52 In Justice Breyer’s view, the
Fruits Doctrine did a better job harmonizing the Court’s precedent, guiding
future government agent conduct, and facilitating judicial decisionmaking.53
The Seibert decision also demonstrates why it is properly included in this
study, because in its record and recognized by the plurality, there was a stark
example of what this Article contends should be the primary policy factor
the nation’s highest courts should employ in reconciling the interest
reflected in the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines—the flagrancy of the
government’s unconstitutional misconduct. This Article advocates for fully
defining flagrant. Seibert presented an additional and egregious component
of a robust definition of flagrant government unconstitutional conduct.54
Justice Souter cited multiple police training manuals, including a national
manual, urging departmental-wide resort to an unconstitutional workaround
of Miranda protections by interrogating first, and then, only after securing a
confession, providing the accused with Miranda warnings.55 The plurality,
however, did not make evidence of such intentional, systemic violation of
the Constitution the deciding basis for its holding, and thereby left the door
open for the government to continue to deliberately train officers to violate

49. Id. at 616–18.
50. The plurality opinion’s attempt to avoid the Fruits Doctrine, seeking to avoid
reconsideration of its Elstad decision, was completely unconvincing, but more importantly,
unnecessary. Id. at 614 n.4. One page later the opinion expressly referenced the Elstad holding and
asserted that, in the facts of that case, the relationship between the first and second confessions were
“speculative and attenuated.” Id. at 615.
51. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615–16.
52. See id. at 617–18 (Breyer, J., concurring) (plurality opinion) (employing the Fruits Doctrine
to justify exclusion).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 611–13
55. See id. at 609–11 (mentioning multiple law enforcement training manuals instructing how to
circumvent Miranda warnings).
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the Constitution so long as they did it in the field, including in the accused’s
residence.
Instead, the opinion rested primarily on what police and an accused were
most likely thinking during the—interrogate first, Mirandize later—custodial
course of interrogation.56
In another plurality decision, announced the same day as Seibert, the Court
again decided not to employ the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines, while
both dissenting opinions believed the analytic frameworks provided by
those doctrines was the appropriate basis for resolving the issue of whether
to exclude the gun, which was the basis of the conviction.57 None of the
opinions, however, made the partial and relatively innocuous violation of
Miranda warnings, presented in the facts of the case, the basis of the
decision.58 Justice Thomas’ plurality opinion seemed more bent on
continuing to challenge the scope of the constitutional mandate of Miranda
by suggesting, with neither strong precedent nor policy, that a Miranda
violation could not justify exclusion of an exhibit.59
A. Defining the Scope of the Study
SCOTUS and state supreme court decisions have employed the Fruits
and Attenuation Doctrines to evaluate claims made in the context of alleged
violations of the Constitution’s Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
including similar or identical provisions in the constitutions of the several
states.60 Hence, the doctrines are potentially applicable to alleged search
and seizures, confessions, and right to counsel violations, so this Article will
identify and evaluate state supreme court decisions that involve one or more
of these rights.61

56. See id. at 615–16 (discussing why mid-interrogation Miranda warnings under facts similar to
Elstad v. Oregon may be adequate; however, the Court decided those facts were distinct from the
interrogation technique used against Seibert).
57. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 645–47 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); Id. at 647–48
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 635 & n.1 (“Detective Benner attempted to advise [Patane] of his Miranda rights
but got no further than the right to remain silent. At that point, [Patane] interrupted, asserting that he
knew his rights, and neither officer attempted to complete the warning.”).
59. See discussion of Wong Sun supra, and in that case, as with others to follow, the application
of the Fruits Doctrine resulted in the exclusion of exhibits. Id. 542 U.S. at 643–44.
60. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 700 N.W.2d 899, 905–08 (Wis. 2005) (discussing the far-reaching
applicability of the Fruits Doctrine to alleged Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment violations).
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B. Identifying the Criteria for Determining Whether a State Supreme Court Decision
is Within the Scope of the Study
In defining the scope of this study, a related issue involved determining
the criteria for qualifying cases for potential inclusion in the study. To
qualify, the government investigatory technique under review must have
violated a national or state constitutional right. Given this focus on
constitutional federalism issues, excluded are cases determined to involve an
illegal but not an unconstitutional GIT.62 Also excluded, for the same
reason, were cases in which the state supreme court determined that the
GIT in question only violated a specific state constitutional provision that
did not have an analogous federal constitutional provision.63
II. ALLOCATION OF THE BURDENS OF PROOF—BURDEN OF
PRODUCTION AND BURDEN OF PERSUASION WITH RESPECT
TO THE FRUITS AND ATTENUATION DOCTRINES
There are important procedural issues that set the stage for how the
assessment of the sequential issues of establishing constitutional rights, an
unconstitutional violation of one or more of such rights, and the Fruits
Doctrine and its relationship to the Attenuation Doctrine will be
undertaken. One important issue is multi-faceted and sequential—who has
the burden of production and persuasion to prove each of these sequential
issues? With respect to whether the accused qualifies for the right claimed,
SCOTUS and most state supreme courts allocate both the burden of
production and persuasion to the accused.64

62. See generally Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2001) (exampling a subpoena for
phone records as an unauthorized form of government pre-trial discovery. The dissent lamented the
decision, signaling the end of the Fruits Doctrine in the Commonwealth (non-constitutional
illegalities)). See also Commonwealth v. Long, 69 N.E.3d 981, 989, 992 (Mass. 2017) (concluding
prosecution did not satisfy state wiretap statute threshold requirement); State v. Adams, 763 S.E.2d
341, 347–48 (S.C. 2014) (finding no federal jurisprudence and turning to the state statute regulating
installation of GPS devices); State v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1032, 1034 (Wash. 2014) (recording
conversation in which accused confessed violated state privacy act but neither the national nor the state
constitutions).
63. See State v. Bilant, 36 P.3d 883, 886–87 (Mont. 2001) (examining how the Montana
constitution included a specific right to privacy, and analogizing the search protection of that right to
the protections found under the Fourth Amendment, in the context of a Fruits Doctrine assessment,
to Montana’s provision).
64. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (discussing the government’s ability
to use an electronic recording device); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (attaching and using
GPS devices on vehicles is within the Fourth Amendment); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318
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The second sequence of the burden of production and persuasion
allocation issues is whether there was an initial unconstitutional GIT
employed. In some cases, there may be a related sequential issue: whether
there was another subsequent, independent, unconstitutional GIT(s). Here,
the definitive precedent from SCOTUS and the state supreme courts
becomes less systemic and clear-cut, particularly regarding the burden of
production.
Once the accused has convinced SCOTUS that he qualifies for the
constitutional right claimed, allocation of the burden of production is
unclear, but SCOTUS appears to follow the guideline that the party having
the ultimate burden of persuasion likewise has the burden of production.65
SCOTUS has placed the burden of persuasion on the government to prove
their course of investigation honored the constitutional right, for which the
accused has proven he qualified.66 Similarly, the Court has required the
government to also bear the burden of persuasion with respect to proving
that a warrant-based search or seizure was done with probable cause and
satisfied the other requirements of the Fourth Amendment.67 SCOTUS
has also required the government bears the burden of persuasion regarding
proving a warrantless search and seizure falls within those facts that establish
one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant clause.68
The next allocation of the burden of proof issues is two-fold. First,
evaluating if the Fruits Doctrine requires or if the Attenuation Doctrine
(1994) (discussing custody); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (examining interrogation); State
v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2020) (discussing suspicion-less searches).
65. Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (stating the prosecution has the burden of
proof on admissibility of evidence sprouting from allegedly unconstitutional police misconduct).
66. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 n.1 (2004) (discussing allocation of burden of
persuasion on the government to prove “at least by a preponderance of the evidence” the initial GIT
was not unconstitutional when that GIT was honoring Miranda warnings and by proving the
voluntariness of the subsequent confession); Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 (holding the government has the
burden of proving the admissibility of a confession, which strongly suggests that at that point, given
the facts and reasoning in Brown, the government was allocated the burden of persuasion to prove the
confession was admissible at step one in terms of proving the accused’s constitutional rights were not
violated in securing the confession, including the confession constituting the fruit of unconstitutional
conduct. If that fails, then proving there was sufficient attenuation to excuse exclusion).
67. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (discussing, in part, when an officer
has reasonable cause for a search or seizure); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (discussing a twopronged test for probable cause).
68. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted) (“The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ and there must be a ‘showing by those
who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.’ ‘[T]he
burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.’”).
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excuses exclusion. Second, whether the unconstitutional GIT is a probable
cause of the government securing the evidence sought to be excluded at the
suppression hearing, trial, or on appeal. These are the allocations of these
burdens of proof to the Fruits Doctrine. The fact that in most cases, like
these, the most reliable sources of evidence would appear to be in the
possession of the government strongly favors allocating the duty to produce
those records to the government.69 The Supreme Court has placed the
burden of persuasion on the government, this time to prove the negative:
that the unconstitutional prior GIT was not the reason for the seizure of the
evidence.70
The final inquiry in this sequence of allocation of the burden of proof
regarding these doctrines is premised on findings that the evidence sought
to be admitted by the government, at the suppression hearing, trial, or on
appeal, was the fruit of the unconstitutional GIT(s). Did the prosecution’s
crime-charging decision or other evidence, nevertheless, justify admitting
the evidence under the Attenuation Doctrine? SCOTUS, while not
expressly allocating the burden of production regarding the Attenuation
Doctrine, has held the burden of persuasion is on the government to
ultimately prove the Fruits Doctrine was trumped by the Attenuation
Doctrine.71
During the two decades under review (2000–2020), more than a dozen
state supreme courts correctly placed the burden of persuasion on the
government to prove a constitutional right was not violated, and if there was
an unconstitutional GIT, that neither the Fruits Doctrine nor the
69. The police reports, written or oral, are available to begin identifying and evaluating the
course of the government’s investigatory techniques. Their records of the course of interrogation, in
confession cases such as Brown, should serve as presumptively the most likely available source to begin
identifying and evaluating if those confessions were probably caused by the unconstitutional seizure.
Brown, 422 U.S. at 604.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 604–05. See generally United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (illustrating the
conceptual relationship between the Fruits Doctrine, applicable to unconstitutional GITs, which
violate the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment rights of an accused, and the subset of that doctrine in
a series of identifications of the accused where the unconstitutional GIT is somewhere in that line of
identifications). In Crews, the unconstitutional GIT was a Fourth Amendment violation—an illegal
arrest—which was followed by two pre-trial identifications from a photo array and a line-up. Id.
at 465–68. The lower courts and SCOTUS agreed those identifications were the fruit of the illegal
arrest and, therefore, were subject to exclusion. Id. at 467–70. The issue was, however, the trial
identification by the same witness, and whether the pre-trial viewing opportunity and its confirmation
by pre-taint descriptions by the witness served to free the trial identification from the illegal arrest taint.
Id. at 469–73.
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Attenuation Doctrine applied to excuse exclusion.72 However, a handful
of state supreme courts, expressly or by implication, decided to shift the
burden of the persuasion to the defendant to prove firstly that there was an
initial unconstitutional GIT, and secondly that the evidence seized by a
subsequent GIT was primarily the product of the use of the prior
unconstitutional GIT.73
The South Dakota Supreme Court made a series of decisions that
provided some evidence that its sometimes erroneous assertion allocating
the burden of proof to the accused could be attributed in part to its failure

72. Holmes v. State, 65 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Ark. 2002); see also State v. Brunetti, 901 A.2d 1, 22
(Conn. 2006) (placing the burden of persuasion on the government to prove that consent to search a
home was voluntary); State v. Trinque 400 P.3d 470, 482 (Haw. 2017) (stating the State has the burden
to demonstrate the evidence was not gained from prior illegal searches); State v. Bishop, 203 P.3d 1203,
1210 (Idaho 2009) (relying on the national Constitution to allocate burden of persuasion on these
sequential issues); State v. Sanders, 445 P.3d 1144, 1150 (Kan. 2019) (allocating burden of persuasion
generally to the government at a suppression hearing); State v. Jefferson, 310 P.3d 331, 339 (Kan. 2013)
(explaining the Attenuation Doctrine exception); Thornton v. State, 214 A.3d 34, 45 (Md. 2019)
(requiring the government to prove that the alleged primary unconstitutional GIT—a frisk—was
constitutional); Elliott v. State, 10 A.3d 761, 770 (Md. 2010) (holding the government must prove that
the conduct was a stop and not an arrest); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 126 N.E.3d 981, 995 (Mass.
2019) (requiring the Commonwealth to establish the evidence presented was sufficiently attenuated
from other illegalities to be free of taint); Commonwealth v. Gentile, 2 N.E.3d 873, 885 (Mass. 2014)
(requiring the Commonwealth to show “that the evidence it has obtained and intends to use is
sufficiently attenuated from the underlying illegality so as to be purged from its taint.” (quoting
Commonwealth v. Damiano, 828 N.E.2d 510, 518 (2005)); State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 142 (Mo.
2011) (mandating the state bear the burden of both producing the evidence and establishing the
evidence should be allowed); In re Ashley, 821 N.W.2d 706, 720 (Neb. 2012) (listing attenuation as a
necessary element for preclusion of the exclusionary rule); State v. Morrill, 156 A.3d 1028, 1034–35
(N.H. 2017) (stating illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the state proves the taint was purged);
State v. Thompkin, 143 P.3d 530, 536 (Or. 2006) (summarizing a three-part test used to show illegally
obtained evidence is admissible); State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 755 (Tenn. 2011) (involving a
warrantless search as the primary taint); State v. Hawkins, 67 A.3d 230, 237 (Vt. 2013) (discussing the
presumption of illegal and inadmissible evidence stemming from a violation of a person’s constitutional
rights); State v. Kinzy, 5 P.3d 668, 674–75 (Wash. 2000) (regarding the warrantless seizure as the
primary taint).
73. Cox v. State, 28 A.3d 687, 699 (Md. 2011); see also State v. Nelson, 356 P.3d 1113, 1120
(Okla. Crim. App. 2014) (holding the accused must prove that the government violated his rights and
that the evidence at issue was derivative of that illegality); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912,
930 (Pa. 2019) (stating appellant failed to show the illegal search tainted the investigation); State v.
Tenold, 937 N.W.2d 6, 13 (S.D. 2019) (stating the party seeking suppression of evidence bears the
burden of proving illegality); State v. Heney, 839 N.W.2d 558, 562 (S.D. 2013) (placing on the accused
the burden of proving the but for causal link between the original unconstitutional GIT, and the
subsequent GIT that resulted in the seizure of evidence at issue).
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to distinguish between the allocation of the burdens of production and
persuasion with respect to these doctrines.74
The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, still reached an erroneous
decision regarding allocating the burden of persuasion on these issues,
despite the fact the court based its analysis on separating the issues of the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion.75
Once the burden of persuasion shifts to the accused, a state’s supreme
court can focus on the failure of the accused to produce convincing
evidence that the tainted GIT was the primary reason the police or
prosecutors had the opportunity to subsequently seize the evidence at
issue.76
The switching of the burden of persuasion to the accused to establish that
the Fruits Doctrine applies invites sequential conceptual confusion, taking
the form of such a court next failing to clearly allocate the burden of
persuasion to the government with respect to establishing that the
Attenuation Doctrine justified excusing exclusion.77
This unconstitutional shifting of the burden of persuasion may also be
attributed to conscious or unconscious policy choices. Once a court
correctly decides the national Constitution places the burden of persuasion
on the government to prove the right established by the accused was
honored and the government fails to do so, to then require the accused to
prove the unconstitutional GIT caused the seizure of the evidence at issue,
is flawed conceptually and as a matter of interest analysis.78 When a state
supreme court determines it can rest its decision to excuse excluding
evidence on the failure of the accused to satisfy the burden of proof, it may

74. See Tenold, 937 N.W.2d at 18 (requiring proof by the government that the probable cause
standard for issuance of a valid search warrant was satisfied); State v. Rosales, 860 N.W.2d 251, 256
(S.D. 2015) (stating the defendant must show the connection between the illegal taint and the evidence
sought to be suppressed); Heney, 839 N.W.2d at 562 (requiring the defendant to bear the burden of
establishing the evidence stems from a constitutional violation and should thus be inadmissible).
75. King v. State, 76 A.3d 1035, 1044 (Md. 2013).
76. Santiago, 209 A.3d at 930.
77. See id. at 930 (characterizing the state’s responsibility as the opportunity to offer proof of
such exceptions to exclusions once the accused has satisfied his burden of proof with respect to the
Fruits Doctrine).
78. During the study period, the Maryland Court of Appeals has made this error. Compare
Thornton v. State, 214 A.3d 34, 45 (Md. 2019) (holding the government must prove that alleged
primary unconstitutional GIT, a frisk, was constitutional); with King, 76 A.3d at 1044 (holding the
accused must prove Fruits Doctrine applies).
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fail to evaluate the dimension of the government’s unconstitutional
conduct.79
In part, the shift in the allocation of the burden of proof with respect to
these doctrines may be attributed to the courts’ misinterpretation of the
significance of the national Constitution in our federal system, leading the
state supreme court to require the accused to argue and convince the court
that the state constitution provided more protection on the array of issues
surrounding the Fruits Doctrine than that provided by the national
Constitution.80
By shifting the burden of persuasion to the accused with respect to these
doctrines, a state supreme court may nevertheless correctly decide the case,
given the record has no evidence the unconstitutional GIT prompted the
subsequent GIT, which produced the evidence at issue.81
III. THE FRUITS DOCTRINE IN THE STATE SUPREME COURTS FROM
2000–2020
This Article turns next to the study of the state supreme courts’ Fruits
Doctrine jurisprudence during the first twenty years of this millennium. The
governing hypothesis tested in this part is when the issue is presented for
decision, these courts will find the Fruits Doctrine requires exclusion. This
part will focus on cases in which the court reached a decision without relying
primarily on the Attenuation Doctrine.
The first step in systematically examining and searching for the
appropriate accommodation of the competing interest reflected in the Fruits
and Attenuation Doctrines is to document how the state supreme courts
evaluate and determine if there was a “primary taint”—the initial
unconstitutional government investigative technique—which triggered the
possible application of the Fruits Doctrine. A key hypothesis of this part of
this Article is that the nature of the initial and possible further
unconstitutional GIT(s) in the same course of government conduct will play
a significant role in determining the presumptive scope of the Fruits
Doctrine.

79. See Santiago, 209 A.3d at 930 (demonstrating how the court, assisted by defense counsel
concession and similar lack of focus on this issue, never evaluated how long the officer studied the
accused’s photograph provided him as a result of the illegal search of his cell phone, or whether the
officer retained the photo, and examined it after the first view).
80. Id. at 921. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
81. State v. Heney, 839 N.W.2d 558, 563–65 (S.D. 2013).
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Unconstitutional searches of a home and analogous structures which
result in the seizure of the accused’s effects, contraband, or incriminating
statements are excluded by most of these courts, employing the Fruits
Doctrine.82
When government agents stop, detain, frisk, arrest, or search a vehicle, its
passengers, or a pedestrian bereft of or with inadequate evidence, state
supreme courts, sometimes relying on their state constitution, and
sometimes at odds with SCOTUS decisions, have held that the Fruits
Doctrine requires exclusion of evidence seized as a result of the
unconstitutional government course of conduct.83
Police observations during an unconstitutional seizure, as well as possible
use of those observations to criminalize the accused’s failure to then obey
government agent commands, are included in the scope of the exclusion
ordered by these courts, provided the failure itself was not a separate
82. See State v. Spencer, 848 A.2d 1183, 1198 (Conn. 2004) (finding the warrantless search of
the defendant’s apparent required suppression of the evidence obtained); State v. Lee, 821 A.2d 922,
923 (Md. 2003) (violating the knock and announce element of the constitution, and contraband seized);
Commonwealth v. Gentile, 2 N.E.3d 873, 885 (Mass. 2014) (finding the evidence seized “were fruits
of the illegal entry, and the connection between the illegality and the granting of consent was
‘sufficiently intimate’ that the consent cannot be found to have been so attenuated from the illegal
entry as to be purged from its taint”); State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1171 (N.M. 2015) (finding the low
flying helicopter hovering over the back of house disturbed the curtilage of home and was therefore a
search).
83. Keenom v. State, 80 S.W.3d 743, 748–49 (Ark. 2002). See also State v. Weldon, 445 P.3d
103, 112–13 (Haw. 2019) (involving an unconstitutional search of a backpack which resulted in the
discovery of a “baton”); State v. Bishop, 203 P.3d 1203, 1219 (Idaho 2009) (involving an
unconstitutional search based on an officer’s subjective, unjustified feelings); State v. Sanders, 445 P.3d
1144, 1151–54 (Kan. 2019) (involving a pedestrian); Thornton, 214 A.3d at 50 (involving an
unconstitutional frisk); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 126 N.E.3d 981, 994–95 (Mass. 2019) (involving
an unconstitutionally long detention); State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Mo. 2011) (involving an
unconstitutional traffic stop, not relying on any reasonable suspicion); State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719,
725 (Mo. 2007) (finding evidence seized during an illegal detention during a traffic stop is inadmissible);
In re Ashley, 821 N.W.2d 706, 720 (Neb. 2012) (involving a suspicion-less stop of a vehicle in which
juvenile accused was a passenger); Torres v. State, 341 P.3d 652, 658 (Nev. 2015) (holding a stop
became an illegal detention, and detaining person while holding his identification and conducting a
warrant search because of that detention required suppression of a gun found after warrant search
found two arrest warrants); State v. Morrill, 156 A.3d 1028, 1036 (N.H. 2017) (relying on state
constitution); State v. Blesdell-Moore, 91 A.3d 619, 625 (N.H. 2014) (failing to set free at the end of
the constitutionally permissible stop); State v. Badessa, 885 A.2d 430, 437–38 (N.J. 2005) (involving
the suppression of evidence of a breathalyzer test); State v. Bailey, 338 P.3d 702, 715 (Or. 2014) (finding
an officer’s failure to advise the defendant they were free to leave, resulted in an unconstitutional
seizure); State v. Tenold, 937 N.W.2d 6, 13–14 (S.D. 2019) (involving the suppression of evidence
resulting from an officer’s suspicion-less traffic stop); State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Tenn.
2011) (rejecting the justification of a search as incident to an arrest absent a resulting arrest).
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crime.84 Courts almost always hold that effects and contraband seized,
contemporaneously with an unconstitutional stop or arrest, and the
subsequent use of such tainted evidence to then arrest the accused, search a
vehicle, or testify as to those observations and seizures at trial, are subject
to exclusion.85
Once an unconstitutional GIT is identified by these courts, they have
frequently held over the last two decades that the Fruits Doctrine requires
exclusion of effects (items acquired, instrumentalities, contraband, crime
evidence) thereafter seized, as well as any consent or incriminating
statements of the arrestee, even if voluntary, provided the effects, consent,
or statements are a product primarily of that unconstitutional GIT.86
However, seven state supreme courts’ assessments of the interests at
stake in making primarily a Fruits Doctrine evaluation found the doctrine
inapplicable, therefore, excusing exclusion.87 Two courts made these
holdings despite the record before the court, including facts that should
have dictated an interest assessment that would end with a strong

84. State v. Hammond, 778 A.2d 108, 118 (Conn. 2001); Bishop, 203 P.3d at 1220; see also Sund,
215 S.W.3d at 725 (holding contraband found in the trunk of the vehicle inadmissible); Torres, 341 P.3d
at 658 (Nev. 2015) (finding “without reasonable suspicion, the discovery of arrest warrants cannot
purge the taint from an illegal seizure”); Badessa, 885 A.2d at 435–37 (N.J. 2005) (discussing the
suppression of an officer’s testimony regarding the observations made about the defendant during an
illegal stop).
85. See State v. Santos, 838 A.2d 981, 992–93 (Conn. 2004); Hammond, 778 A.2d at 118; Bishop,
203 P.3d at 1219; Elliott v. State, 10 A.3d 761, 774 (Md. 2010); Commonwealth v. White, 59 A.3d 369,
379 (Mass. 2016); Sund, 215 S.W.3d at 725; Torres, 341 P.3d at 658 (Nev. 2015); Badessa, 885 A.2d
at 437–38 (requiring suppression of evidence obtained during an illegal stop or arrest).
86. See State v. Joseph, 128 P.3d 795, 812 (Haw. 2006) (finding the Miranda violation as primary
taint and subsequent accused’s statements as fruits); State v. Pringle, 805 A.2d 1016, 1030–33 (Md.
2002) (detailing the events surrounding petitioner’s arrest and a lack of interceding attenuation);
Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 121 N.E.3d 166, 177–78 (Mass. 2019) (holding consent elicited by
express reference [a “flagrancy” metric] to effects seized as a result of an unconstitutional search); State
v. Bray, 902 N.W.2d 98, 111–14 (Neb. 2017) (finding valid consent notwithstanding the prior
unconstitutional search); State v. Socci, 98 A.3d 474, 483 (N.H. 2014) (holding the evidence will only
be admissible if the consent was “voluntary and not an exploitation of the prior illegality.”); State v.
Thompkin, 143 P.3d 530, 537 (Or. 2006) (volunteering incriminating evidence as fruit of
unconstitutional detention); State v. Hawkins, 67 A.3d 230, 237 (Vt. 2013) (analyzing statements made
by accused following an illegal arrest).
87. King v. State, 76 A.3d 1035, 1042 (Md. 2013); Knapp v. Comm’r. Pub. Safety, 610 N.W.2d
625, 629 (Minn. 2000); State v. McGurk, 958 A.2d 1005, 1010–11 (N.H. 2008); State v. Tolentino,
926 N.E.2d 1212, 1215–16 (N.Y. 2010); State v. Pederson, 801 N.W.2d 723, 729 (N.D. 2011); State v.
Nelson, 356 P.3d 1113, 1121 (Okla. Crim. App. 2015); State v. Felix, 811 N.W.2d 775, 790–91 (Wis.
2012).
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justification for application of the Fruits Doctrine.88 First, the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the government’s authority to have its agents seize
or search without any justification—opening the door to the use of race,
gender, and class as the reason for the unconstitutional GIT.89 The majority
of the New York Court of Appeals was willing to excuse this most flagrant
violation of Fourth Amendment protection by crediting the government’s
luck that the accused, once seized, turned out to be a person who had a
record that merited arrest and prosecution.90
Second, the record before the Minnesota Supreme Court included strong
evidence that contradicted the court’s conclusion—the unconstitutional
GIT was the only reason for the subsequent search or seizure that produced
the evidence at issue on appeal.91
Some of these courts followed SCOTUS in limiting the scope of the
Fruits Doctrine per se, based on the nature of the primary unconstitutional
GIT and the courts’ policy assessment of the interest implicated by that
GIT.92 In considering the protections afforded by the United States
Constitution—as opposed to their state constitution—these courts adhered
to the rule set out in New York v. Harris.93 The primary unconstitutional
GIT that triggers this outlier rule is an arrest in the home, supported by
probable cause but without an arrest warrant, which subsequently produces
incriminating evidence after the suspect is removed from his home.94 In
perspective, this policy position may also serve to divert attention from a
88. See Tolentino, 926 N.E. 2d at 1215 (stating “defendant’s DMV records were . . . not
suppressible as the fruit of the purportedly illegal stop”); Knapp, 610 N.W.2d at 629.
89. See Tolentino, 926 N.E. 2d at 1215 (pulling over accused without cause, resulting in seizure
of the accused). The dissent makes it clear that this flaw was the core reason the judge dissented. Id.
at 1218 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 1213 (driving with a suspended license; however, at the time of the unconstitutional
seizure, police had no basis for even suspecting the accused of that crime).
91. See Knapp, 610 N.W.2d at 628 (assuming there was inadequate evidence to justify the
breathalyzer test which produced an inclusive result, but if that is true, the subsequent order not to
drive was unconstitutional, and that order was the only evidence the officer possessed for stopping the
accused only a few minutes later).
92. Pederson, 801 N.W.2d at 728–29; Felix, 811 N.W.2d at 789–90.
93. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20–21 (1990) (holding where the police make an arrest
in a home without a warrant but with probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not render evidence
inadmissible when the statement by the accused is made outside of his home and after the arrest).
94. Pederson, 801 N.W.2d at 729; see also Felix, 811 N.W.2d at 784 (challenging the admissibility
of defendant’s statement made at the police station, asserting that it must be suppressed under the
attenuation analysis, rather than the Harris rule). But see State v. Eserjose, 259 P.3d 172, 181–82 (Wash.
2011) (rejecting the per se approach but adopting some of the Harris court’s reasoning under the
Attenuation Doctrine to conclude exclusion was not justified).
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careful assessment of the facts in the record to determine the nature and
number of unconstitutional GITS—the first step required in order to make
a principled fruits evaluation. The North Dakota Supreme Court, for
example, omitted giving any consideration to the record on appeal regarding
whether it demonstrated that the police had probable cause to make the
arrest, since the only evidence of probable cause was the police officers’
assertion that their confidential informant told them of robberies at the
motel occupied by the accused.95
State supreme courts, which based their fruits/attenuation evaluations on
their state constitution rather than the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by SCOTUS, are more likely to conclude that the Fruits
Doctrine applies and requires exclusion.96 Reliance on the state
constitution is more likely to produce an outcome applying the Fruits
Doctrine when the state supreme court first expands what constituted an
unconstitutional search or seizure beyond the definition of SCOTUS.97
Reliance on the state constitution was also more likely to produce an
outcome applying the Fruits Doctrine when the court finds that its state
provision has multiple policy goals, including goals beyond deterring
unconstitutional police conduct, such as those related to protecting the
privacy interests of state citizens.98
95. See Pederson, 801 N.W.2d at 729 (finding no incriminating evidence was seized at the motel).
96. Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 818–21 (Del. 2000); State v. Weldon, 445 P.3d 103, 115
(Haw. 2019); State v. Trinque, 400 P.3d 470, 481 (Haw. 2017); State v. Eli, 273 P.3d 1196, 1209–11
(Haw. 2012); State v. Joseph, 128 P.3d 795, 806 (Haw. 2006); Commonwealth. v. Fredericq,
121 N.E.3d 166, 176 (Mass. 2019); State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2020); State v.
Morrill, 156 A.3d 1028, 1034 (N.H. 2017); State v. Blesdell-Moore, 91 A.3d 619, 623 (N.H. 2014). But
see State v. McGurk, 958 A.2d 1005, 1010–11 (N.H. 2008) (applying their state constitution and finding
the taint was purged); State v. O’Neill, 936 A.2d 438, 454–58 (N.J. 2007); State v. Thompkin, 143 P.3d
530, 536 (Or. 2006); see also State v. Tatro, 445 P.3d 173, 180 (Kan. 2019) (identifying the possible
outcome determinative consequence—i.e., waiver—when a defendant fails to raise and argue that the
state constitution provides greater protection than that of its analogous federal constitutional
provision).
97. See Weldon, 445 P.3d at 115 (establishing a stop takes place anytime the police approach and
question a citizen for purposes of investigating their possible participation in criminal activity); see also
infra notes 129–131 discussing SCOTUS’ decision in Strieff; O’Neill, 936 A.2d at 457 (holding “that
when Miranda warnings are given after a custodial interrogation has already produced incriminating
statements, the admissibility of post-warning statements will turn on whether the warnings functioned
effectively in providing the defendant the ability to exercise his state law privilege against selfincrimination”).
98. Blesdell-Moore, 91 A.3d at 626; State v. Chippero, 753 A.2d 701, 707(N.J. 2000) (citing state
precedent for the proposition that, in addition to deterrence of police misconduct, excluding evidence
in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial system, is also a policy goal). But see Eserjose, 259 P.3d
at 178 (finding the “paramount concern [of state provision regulating search and seizures] is to protect
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Reliance on the state constitution is especially more likely to produce an
outcome finding the Fruits Doctrine required exclusion when the court
adopts the federalism policy of applying the state constitution first, and
therefore, possibly only the state constitution.99 Even when these courts
place reliance on the three-factor evaluation, which is most frequently
associated with Attenuation Doctrine analysis, the courts found that the
Fruits Doctrine requires exclusion.100
Reliance on the state constitution by the accused is also per se required
when the case reaches the court on remand from SCOTUS, which had
reversed the state court’s ruling that the Fruits Doctrine under the United
States Constitution requires exclusion.101 But this review posture does not
necessarily mean that the state supreme court will stick with its original
decision and hold that the state constitution requires application of the
Fruits Doctrine.102 The Maryland Court of Appeals determined that its
constitution provided no greater search and seizure protection than that
provided by the national Constitution, and in addition, that Maryland law
did not have an express exclusionary rule remedy.103
In summary, the overall finding on the first major hypothesis of this study
is that a substantial majority of the state supreme courts (20 of 27) evaluating
the merits of applying the Fruits Doctrine, were led by their interest analysis

the privacy [interest of its citizens].” Nevertheless, such provision provided no greater protection
under the facts of the record on appeal). See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
99. Fredericq, 121 N.E.3d at 181; Weldon, 445 P.3d at 115; Morrill, 156 A3d at 1034; Blesdell-Moore,
91 A.3d at 623; O’Neill, 936 A.2d at 454–58; see also Thompkin, 143 P.3d at 537 (applying only the state
constitution, and expressly reiterating that its constitutional provision regulating and providing
exclusion as a remedy with respect to search and seizures issues, protects the rights of its citizens). But
see State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1166 (N.M. 2015) (noting that the New Mexico Supreme Court
follows the “interstitial approach” to this issue, whereby it first evaluates if the right claimed is protected
by the national Constitution, and if so, the court will not evaluate the overlapping state constitutional
provision).
100. See Fredericq, 121 N.E.3d at 178–81 (affirming the order granting defendant’s motion to
suppress, relying on analysis of the exclusionary rule under state constitution application); Blesdell-Moore,
91 A.3d at 626–27.
101. See Knapp, 700 N.W.2d at 901 (deciding on remand that the state constitution requires
exclusion).
102. King v. State, 76 A.3d 1035, 1042 (Md. 2013). The earlier decision, which was later
reconsidered, was made just a year before in King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 581 (Md. 2012).
103. See King, 76 A.3d at 1041–42 (interpreting the state constitution in pari materia with the
United States Constitution on these issues. There was no primary taint in the first DNA state statute
mandated swab test, thus the second swab could not be the fruit of the first swab).
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to conclude that the doctrine required exclusion.104 The Maryland,
Minnesota, and New Hampshire Supreme Courts made decisions landing
on both sides of the Fruits Doctrine’s interest analysis evaluations.105 The
Minnesota Supreme Court appeared to give more emphasis in its more
recent decision to the flagrancy of the police misconduct in determining if
the Fruits Doctrine requires exclusion.106 The court used but rearranged
the order of its analysis of the three considerations usually associated with
the Attenuation Doctrine evaluation, to move the purpose and flagrancy of
the government’s unconstitutional course of conduct to serve as the first
and most significant consideration.107 On the other hand, the interest
evaluations in the New Hampshire Supreme Court decision denying
exclusion based on the Fruits Doctrine, and the two requiring exclusion
104. See Keenom v. State, 80 S.W.3d 743, 748–49 (Ark. 2002) (excluding the verbal admission,
consent, contraband, and physical evidence, because of the unconstitutional seizure that occurred just
outside his home); Holmes v. State, 65 S.W.3d 860, 864–66 (Ark. 2002); People v. Casillas, 427 P.3d
804, 813 (Colo. 2018); State v. Spencer, 848 A.2d 1183, 1197–98 (Conn. 2004); see also State v.
Brocuglio, 826 A.2d 145, 156 (Conn. 2003) (determining the new crime exception to exclusion could
not retroactively apply to the accused in the present case in which the exception was adopted); Dorsey
v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 821 (Del. 2000) (holding the state constitution’s probable cause provision—
which rejects the “good faith” exception—provides stronger Fruits Doctrine protection than its federal
counterpart); Weldon, 445 P.3d at 115–16; State v. Trinque, 400 P.3d 470, 485 (Haw. 2017); State v.
Joseph, 128 P.3d 795, 811–12 (Haw. 2006) (rejecting under state constitution the two-step police
interrogation to skirt Miranda strategy); State v. Eli, 273 P.3d 1196, 1211 (Haw. 2012) (“[T]he
incriminating statement given by defendant . . . was obtained in violation of the Miranda rule,
[therefore] the statement should not have been admitted in evidence and must be excluded.”); State v.
Bishop, 203 P.3d 1203, 1220 (Idaho 2009); State v. Lee, 821 A.2d 922, 924, 935 (Md. 2003);
Commonwealth v. Goncalves-Mendez, 138 N.E.3d 1038, 1043 (Mass. 2020); King, 76 A.3d at 1042–44
(applying the doctrine to the second DNA sample obtained by a warrant, based on the results of the
unconstitutional, warrantless, and suspicionless first DNA sample, which was authorized by statute);
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 126 N.E.3d 981, 995–96 (Mass. 2019); Commonwealth v. Gentile,
2 N.E.3d 873, 884–85 (Mass. 2014); State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 152–53 (Minn. 2020); State v.
Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719, 725 (Mo. Banc. 2007); In re Ashley, 821 N.W.2d 706, 720–22 (Neb. 2012);
Torres v. State, 341 P.3d 652, 658 (Nev. 2015) (en banc), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016), remanded to
426 P.3d 604 (Nev. 2018); Davis, 360 P.3d at 1172–73; Morrill, 156 A.3d at 1035–36; Blesdell-Moore,
91 A.3d at 625–27; O’Neill, 936 A.2d at 441, 458–59; Thompkin, 143 P.3d at 537; State v. Tenold,
937 N.W.2d 6, 13, 18 (S.D. 2019); State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 759–60, 762–63 (Tenn. 2011)
(concluding the money seized was the fruit of warrantless crime scene search, but not the later
“consent” search of the accused home); State v. Hawkins, 67 A.3d 230, 237–38 (Vt. 2013); Knapp,
700 N.W.2d at 901.
105. King, 76 A.3d at 1048; King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 580–81 (Md. 2012), rev’d, 569 U.S. 435
(2013); Leonard, 943 N.W.2d at 152–53; Knapp, 610 N.W.2d at 629; Morrill, 156 A.3d at 1035–36; State
v. McGurk, 958 A.2d 1005, 1010–11 (N.H. 2008).
106. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d at 162.
107. See id. at 155; see also supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing the earlier decision
and its apparent undervaluing of the flagrancy of the government’s unconstitutional course of conduct).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

23

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

24

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1

based on the doctrine identified in this section of the Article are
consistent.108
IV. THE ATTENUATION DOCTRINE IN THE
STATE SUPREME COURTS—2000–2020
A. State Supreme Courts—The Significance of Their Choosing to Focus on the
Attenuation Decisions
The study’s second major hypothesis is that state supreme courts will
make policy assessments which will favor finding that the Attenuation
Doctrine does not trump the Fruits Doctrine, and therefore, exclusion is
still justified. Attenuation decisions even if they reference it, often omit
assessment of the Fruits Doctrine before moving directly to evaluating the
Attenuation Doctrine. These decisions reflect an analytic protocol by such
courts that once attenuation is raised by the prosecution, the fruits
evaluation merges with the attenuation evaluation.109
This conceptual decision cuts both ways with respect to careful
assessment of the interest at stake when finding attenuation, and therefore,
excusing exclusion. First, under the Constitution, SCOTUS has held that
the prosecution must bear the burden of persuasion to prove attenuation.
Once it is proven or the government admits that the unconstitutional
(federal or state) GIT or series of unconstitutional GITs was the sole or
primary reason the evidence at issue was seized and used to convict the
accused.110 Some of the state supreme courts have expressly allocated the
burden of persuasion and thereafter held that the government failed to carry
108. See infra note 125–126 and 218 and accompanying text discussing the reason for the outlier
decision, and why it is consistent with the reasoning of the court in its other decisions.
109. State v. Hummons, 253 P.3d 275, 277–79 (Ariz. 2011); see also State v. Brunetti, 901 A.2d
1, 23–26 (Conn. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 (2007) (establishing an attenuation evaluation despite
the setting of reconsideration, concluding the accused failed to preserve his primary appeal claim);
Spencer, 848 A.2d at 1197–98; State v. Cohagan, 404 P.3d 659, 663–68 (Idaho 2017); People v.
Henderson, 989 N.E.2d 192, 201–05 (Ill. 2013); State v. Lane 726 N.W. 371, 380–92 (Iowa 2007); State
v. Jefferson, 310 P.3d 331, 339–41 (Kan. 2013); Thornton v. State, 214 A.3d 34, 50–57 (Md. 2019);
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (skewing the statement of the Attenuation Doctrine
to add a fourth step to the primary taint, Fruits, and attenuation sequential analysis); Commonwealth
v. Fredericq, 121 N.E.3d 166, 175–81 (Mass. 2019); State v. Bray, 902 N.W.2d 98, 111–14 (Neb. 2017);
State v. Socci, 98 A.3d 474, 479–81 (N.H. 2014); In re J.A., 186 A.3d 266, 273–74 (N.J. 2018); State v.
Bailey, 338 P.3d 702, 708–15 (Org. 2014); Ingram, 331 S.W.3d at 760–63; State v. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d
724, 731–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
110. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (emphasizing the preponderance of the
evidence standard rests on the prosecution to prove attenuation).
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that burden of persuasion.111 There were, however, state supreme courts
which made no reference to that constitutionally mandated allocation of the
burden of persuasion and allocated the burden to the defense.112
Second, and conversely, by not focusing first on an evaluation of the
Fruits Doctrine, these state supreme courts consciously or unconsciously
heighten the significance of the assessment of the state government’s claim
for excusing exclusion. This focus risks undervaluing the accused’s claim
concerning the quantity and quality of the unconstitutional government
conduct that could have been found in the record on appeal as the basis for
justifying the application of the Fruits Doctrine.113
The decision to skip focusing first on an interest analysis assessment of
the Fruits Doctrine and instead focusing only on the Attenuation Doctrine
could possibly prove outcome determinative, unless the attenuation
assessment consistently included a quality evaluation of the interest of the
accused reflected in the Fruits Doctrine. We turn in the next section to
examine how the state supreme courts over the last two decades have sorted
out these issues.
B. State Supreme Courts’ Assessment of Their Attenuation Decisions
This initial evaluation of the relationship between the Fruits and
Attenuation Doctrines, and what is at stake in getting the interest
111. Jefferson, 310 P.3d at 341; Commonwealth v. Gentile, 2 N.E.3d 873, 884–85 (Mass. 2014).
But see Ingram, 331 S.W.3d at 760 (holding government satisfied its burden of persuasion); see also supra
notes 72–73 and accompanying text a list of additional cases allocating the burden of persuasion to the
government, with respect to one or more steps of the evaluation: primary taint, fruits, and attenuation,
followed by a list of decisions erroneously allocating one or more of these burden of persuasion to the
defense.
112. Hummons, 253 P.3d at 277; Jackson, 464 S.W.3d at 734.
113. See Hummons, 253 P.3d at 279 (detaining person without evidence to seek warrant inquiry
is the unconstitutional GIT, yet if a warrant is found immediately thereafter, it attenuates the
unconstitutional GIT, thus foreshadowing Strieff); Brunetti, 901 A.2d at 24–26 (disregarding the number
of independent unconstitutional investigatory techniques law enforcement employed, and heavily
relying on Miranda warnings to constitute the intervening circumstance that reduced the relationship
between the unconstitutional arrest and the defendant’s second confession to a level the court found
acceptable to deny exclusion); Spencer, 848 A.2d at 1197–98 (concluding the record lacked sufficient
evidence to support finding the officers had reasonable belief that conducting the illegal search was
necessary, thus evidence obtained through the search was excluded as the fruit of prior officer illegality);
Ingram, 331 S.W.3d at 762–63 (focusing on the lack of flagrancy in the officer’s behavior in concluding
that the evidence was not obtained by exploitation); Jackson, 464 S.W.3d at 734 (evaluating the interest
implicated by the government’s initial unconstitutional installation of the GPS undervalued the injury
to the rights of the accused—who was barely speeding—by subordinating that injury to the immediate
use thereafter of other constitutional technology to detect the same speeding offense).
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reconciliation right, sets the stage for a more thorough evaluation of how
the almost universally accepted current policy protocol for resolving these
issues does the job. That protocol is most commonly articulated by the state
supreme courts as the standard evaluation protocol for the Attenuation
Doctrine.114
This protocol was born with the initial seminal SCOTUS Fruits case,
altered by the Court, and recently reconfirmed in SCOTUS precedent,
identifying a sequential three-factor Attenuation Doctrine analysis.115
First, the evaluation focuses upon determining the temporal proximity
between the unconstitutional GIT(s) and the subsequent GIT that produced
the evidence seized and sought to be employed by the government.116
Second, the evaluation turns to whether the record of the facts in the case
includes what these courts are willing to characterize as “intervening
conduct or events” taking place between the unconstitutional GIT(s) and
the subsequent GIT that produced the evidence seized and sought to be
employed by the government.117 Third, the evaluation focuses on what
chronologically should be the first (and this Article will advocate primary)
factor evaluated—the flagrancy of the government’s unconstitutional course
of conduct.118

114. See infra notes 118–149 and accompanying text.
115. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061–62
(2016). See supra notes 26–59 and accompanying text.
116. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
117. Id.
118. See id. (evaluating unconstitutional conduct taken by the government); see also Hummons,
253 P.3d at 277–78 (performing the three evaluations, placing emphasis on the flagrancy evaluation);
Brunetti, 901 A.2d at 23–24; Spencer, 848 A.2d at 1192–98; State v. Cohagan, 404 P.3d 659, 664–66
(Idaho 2017) (performing the three evaluations); State v. Sanders, 445 P.3d 1144, 1159 (Kan. 2019)
(finding unconstitutional detention followed by a search, Attenuation Doctrine did not justify use to
admit evidence found during search that was the sole basis for prosecution); State v. Tatro, 445 P.3d
173, 183 (Kan. 2019) (remanding to lower court for further evaluation of the “flagrancy” factor, as that
term was more precisely defined in the opinion); State v. Jefferson, 310 P.3d 331, 341 (Kan. 2013)
(finding the accused’s incriminating statements were fruit of illegal seizure and retention of his car);
Thornton v. State, 214 A.3d 34, 51–57 (Md. 2019); Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 121 N.E.3d 166,
178–81 (Mass. 2019); State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Mo. 2011); State v. Bray, 902 N.W.2d 98,
111 (Neb. 2017); In re Ashley W., 821 N.W.2d 706, 719, 721–22 (Neb. 2012); State v. Socci, 98 A.3d
474, 480 (N.H. 2014) (outlining attenuation factors to determine whether taint of illegal search is
purged); In re J.A., 186 A.3d 266, 277–78 (N.J. 2018); State v. Chippero, 753 A.2d 701, 708–11 (N.J.
2000); State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1173 (N.M. 2015); State v. Bailey, 338 P.3d 702, 713–15 (Or.
2014) (evaluating record of case against attenuation factors and finding circuit court erred by denying
motion to suppress); Ingram, 331 S.W.3d at 761–62; Jackson, 464 S.W.3d at 730; State v. Eserjose,
259 P.3d 172, 179–82 (Wash. 2011) (adopting the Attenuation Doctrine for state constitutional
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The Kansas Supreme Court, when considering whether a confession is
the fruit of the preceding unconstitutional search or seizure, added or
perhaps substituted Miranda warnings for a general inquiry about a
significant intervening conduct or event.119
Scrutiny of the decisions applying this attenuation protocol prompts one
of the crucial conclusions of this Article. Each component of the protocol,
as well as the overall evaluation of their significance standing alone and
relative to each other, and therefore, the resulting decisions employing the
protocol, are fraught, in varying degrees, with the risk of inconsistent and
subjective decision-making.120
This risk of an undesirable level of subjectivity in these decisions is
increased by the fact that many of these state supreme courts have adopted
the component of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, which asserted
there is no required per se comparative significance of any of these factors
in a specific case; and furthermore, that other factors may be relevant in
determining if attenuation should excuse exclusion by trumping the Fruits
Doctrine.121
This risk is further increased by most of these courts taking the approach
of sequentially evaluating each of the factors.122 Hence the first factor
evaluated by most of these courts is the temporal proximity of the
unconstitutional GIT(s) and the GIT that produced the evidence at issue on
appeal. The risk of subjectivity is demonstrated by the fact that some of
these courts declare that temporal proximity is the least significant
consideration in determining if attenuation should excuse exclusion.123
This is despite the fact that the significance of temporal proximity can only
be fairly assessed until the length of the influence of the unconstitutional
course of government conduct on the record is first assessed. An
assessment of the nature and severity of the unconstitutional GIT(s) that is
identified by the judges as the primary taint, or sequence of unconstitutional

evaluation purposes, and noting the close conceptual relationship between fruits and attenuation
analysis).
119. Jefferson, 310 P.3d at 339–41.
120. See id. at 341 (reassessing significance of an accused coming to police and making
incriminating statements after an unconstitutional seizure of his property reassessed by the court, but
still failing to give dual significance to the fact that the police lacked probable cause to search the
vehicles in both cases); Bray, 902 N.W.2d at 111–14; Jackson, 464 S.W.3d at 732–33.
121. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975); Thornton, 214 A.3d at 51.
122. Jefferson, 310 P.3d at 340–41.
123. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d at 733.
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primary taints, and subsequent fruits are necessary to accurately identify the
duration of the temporal proximity.124
Further examination of how the state supreme courts, during the period
of this study, defined and interpreted the significance of the three-factors of
the Attenuation Doctrine follows.
There are two important outcome patterns in these state supreme courts’
decisions which focus on the Attenuation Doctrine. In the first pattern, the
interest analysis by the courts ends by justifying that the Fruits Doctrine is
trumped by the Attenuation Doctrine; and therefore, exclusion is excused.
This outcome pattern is one in which the Court’s decision rests
predominantly on finding a certain type of intervening factor and holding
that the factor per se trumps temporal proximity and flagrancy of the
unconstitutional conduct. State supreme courts have consistently found
that the Fruits Doctrine does not require exclusion when the government
proves that the intervening factor is a separate crime which infringes upon
distinct government interest, and that the evidence at issue on appeal was
seized as a result of that separate crime.125
These courts have held that such crimes include resisting an illegal arrest,
forcibly resisting an unconstitutional intrusion into the accused’s home,
destroying evidence, and assault of a police officer.126 It should be noted
in support of the policy position taken in these cases that this outcome has
the possibility of being employed in a race, gender, and class neutral manner,
especially when the separate crime must be proven beyond reasonable doubt
by the government.
124. See infra notes 217–227 and accompanying text (reviewing how state supreme courts have
ruled on whether evidence should be excluded when potential unconstitutional GITs are involved).
125. See People v. Tomaske, 440 P.3d 444, 448–49 (Colo. 2019) (concluding resisting arrest after
illegal entry was an intervening crime not warranting evidence exclusion); State v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d
145, 155 (Conn. 2003) (holding evidence of interfering with an officer after unlawful entry into home
was admissible); State v. McGurk, 958 A.2d 1005, 1010–11 (N.H. 2008) (finding the ingestion of
marijuana after illegal stop intervened to produce admissible evidence); State v. Panarello, 949 A.2d
732, 736–37 (N.H. 2008) (concluding pointing a gun at an officer after illegal entry was an intervention,
which produced admissible evidence); State v. Nelson, 356 P.3d 1113, 1120 (Okla. Crim. App. 2015)
(holding evidence of resisting arrest and obstruction of justice after illegal traffic stop intervened was
admissible); In re Jeremiah W., 606 S.E.2d 766, 769 (S.C. 2004) (finding evidence of a threat to an officer
after unlawful arrest was admissible); State v. McEachin, 213 A.3d 1094, 1102 (Vt. 2019) (concluding
evidence of an assault on an officer after unlawful detention was rightfully not suppressed).
126. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d at 155; McGurk, 958 A.2d at 1010–11 (explaining the accused charged
originally with interference with government operations ends up pleading to two counts of evidence
tampering—destruction by consumption of seized contraband); Panarello, 949 A.2d at 736–37; Nelson,
356 P.3d at 1120; In re Jeremiah W., 606 S.E.2d at 769; McEachin, 213 A.3d at 1102.
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Not all state supreme courts have taken this position. The Maryland
Court of Appeals held that it will track the Brown tripartite protocol in this
situation, and therefore, an intervening crime does not per se trump the
other two considerations.127 The Court held that the per se approach
would eliminate careful assessment of the severity of the unconstitutional
conduct of the government, thereby eliminating giving appropriate
consideration to the significance of the flagrancy of government agents’
unconstitutional conduct; the factor most closely associated with justifying
exclusion, deterring police misconduct.128
The second and even more policy consequential pattern of outcomes is
the one in which the interest of citizens and government are aligned as they
were in the facts in the record of Utah v. Strieff.129 The Strieff decision
terminated Fourth Amendment rights for those the police choose to accost
on the street without even reasonable suspicion, and thereafter
unconstitutionally seize by demanding identification documentation.130
SCOTUS held that this course of unconstitutional conduct can be excused
and exclusion denied if, thereafter, the government gets lucky and the
person has an arrest warrant which can be accessed while the person is
unconstitutionally seized.131
When generalized, this position by SCOTUS and the minority of state
supreme courts agreeing with that decision means that the Attenuation
Doctrine can be employed by the federal or state governments, for whatever
reason, to decide to search or seize the people or their effects, and thereafter
engage in further unconstitutional investigative techniques based on the
opportunities afforded by the GIT constituting the primary taint, so long as
subsequent purely fortuitous events give the government ostensibly an
interest before seizure of the person or evidence at issue.132 Hence the
127. See Thornton v. State, 214 A.3d 34, 52 (Md. 2019) (“[W]hether the individual’s act purges
the taint of the Fourth Amendment violation must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis by balancing
the factors set forth in Brown.”)
128. See id. (holding purposely initiated and persistent course of police unconstitutional
misconduct could not be excused by accused flight on foot).
129. Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See State v. Hummons, 253 P.3d 275, 279 (Ariz. 2011) (holding an officer may politely
approach a pedestrian and have a consensual conversation with a person, politely request their
identification, and then unconstitutionally detain—seize them—while they run a wants and warrants
check, provided this officer can prove that he doesn’t make a habit of engaging in such conduct—even
more egregiously the burden that the action may be unconstitutional is placed on the accused); People
v. Henderson, 989 N.E.2d 192, 199–200 (Ill. 2013) (finding police stopped a car without reasonable
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government, possibly for reasons of race, gender, or class, can stop a
pedestrian or a vehicle for no pretextual reasons other than focusing on
these impermissible characteristics, and proceed to possibly engage in a
series of additional unconstitutional GITs. People traveling in a vehicle, for
example, can be stopped for no reason, and thereafter ordered out of their
vehicle. If thereafter, a person engaged in a lawful act of running from the
unconstitutional seizure upon leaving the vehicle, drops a gun or
contraband, the taint is gone and the person can be prosecuted and
convicted solely on the basis of possession of the gun, contraband, or other
crime evidence.133 For practical purposes, such decisions signal the end of
the Fruits Doctrine as a shield against possible race and class-based policing
in situations in which the government has no interests at stake when they
began to engage in the unconstitutional course of conduct.
This skewing of the evaluation of the interest at stake in the Strieff fact
pattern can be further distorted if, as a few state supreme courts have found,
a government interest or less flagrant violation of constitutional rights on
the basis that the government agent engaging in the unconstitutional
conduct, subjectively believed he had authority to do so.134 This conclusion
was reached despite the fact it flies in the face of the well-established rule
that the subjective good faith or bad faith belief that the law supports his
actions is irrelevant to determining the constitutionality of that course of
conduct.135 The correct conceptual focus is on the issue of whether a

suspicion); State v. Tatro, 445 P.3d 173, 182–83 (Kan. 2019) (exemplifying when officer stopped a
person on the street at 3:30 a.m. to evaluate whether the flagrancy of the officer’s conduct, justified
exclusion notwithstanding the intervening finding of an arrest warrant that prompted the arrest, which
lead to the search of the person’s effects, which led to the discovery of contraband drug trace).
133. See Henderson, 989 N.E. 2d at 204 (finding the record failed to demonstrate whether the
court or the lawyers inquired whether the two police patrol car officers simply invented the 1:30 a.m.
informant who for no apparent motive to walk to their car, reporting that a person with a gun sitting
in a car somewhere in the vicinity, and a thorough assessment of the intentionality and flagrancy of the
possible government conduct was never made).
134. Tatro, 445 P.3d at 181 (examining flagrancy based on officer’s subjective state of mind and
whether they acted in good faith). Cf. State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 762 (Tenn. 2011) (finding
officers’ mistaken beliefs of the constitutionality of their actions to weigh against suppression of
evidence).
135. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009) (“We have already held that ‘our
good faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably welltrained officer would have known that the search was illegal’ in light of ‘all of the circumstances.”
(quoting United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984))); Casillas v. People, 427 P.3d 804, 810
(Colo. 2018).
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reasonably well-trained officer was aware or should have been aware that
his investigatory technique was constitutional.136
Most state supreme courts who addressed the Strieff fact pattern during
the period of this study, however, including most of these courts who have
decided this issue post-Strieff, have recognized this threat and crafted a rule
that more appropriately accommodates the interest of the government and
the accused under this reoccurring fact pattern.137
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently reiterated that “a free society
will not remain free if police may use . . . crime detection devices at random
and without reason.”138 The Missouri Supreme Court has expressly
recognized that reliance on an alleged unknown informant, even if filtered
through a police dispatch operator, creates an opportunity for the
investigating officers to fabricate the informant.139 The Missouri Supreme
Court also recognized that allowing the government to seize people or
vehicles for no reason opens the door for further unconstitutional searches
and seizures to follow, thereby infusing into the narrative this dimension of
“flagrancy.”140
The Hawaii Supreme Court’s interest analysis effectively departed from
Strieff at the outset of an encounter by eliminating the government’s
authority to “encounter” its citizen pedestrians for investigation, bereft of

136. Herring, 555 U.S. at 145; Casillas, 427 P.3d at 810.
137. See State v. Weldon, 445 P.3d 103, 115 (Haw. 2019) (finding that mere presence of
potentially illegal items near the accused neither constitutes reasonable suspicion nor justifies an
investigative stop); State v. Cohagan, 404 P.3d 659, 666 (Idaho 2017); State v. Sanders, 445 P.3d 1144,
1157 (Kan. 2019); State v. Moralez, 300 P.3d 1090, 1102 (Kan. 2013); State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d
149, 155–56 (Minn. 2020); State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 147–48 (Mo. 2011) (finding a current
warrant after both an illegal stop and an illegal seizure of the person, while an intervening significant
factor, on balance, had to be subordinated to the close temporal proximity of the unconstitutional
GIT(s) and the flagrancy of the officer’s unconstitutional course of conduct); State v. Chippero,
753 A.2d 701, 708–11 (N.J. 2000); State v. Bailey, 338 P.3d 702, 712–14 (Or. 2014) (holding the
purpose of the unconstitutional detention of the accused was to run an arrest warrant check); State v.
Topanotes, 76 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Utah 2003) (declaring government may not resort to an inevitable
discovery theory based on claim that they would have run a wants and warrant check of the accused
after illegally stopping her, even if they had not retained her identification—a driver’s license while
waiting the results of the warrant inquiry).
138. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d at 155 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnston 530 A.2d 74, 79 (Pa.
1987)).
139. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d at 144.
140. See id. at 146–47 (finding an unconstitutional stop of a vehicle, followed by an
unconstitutional seizure of the driver by detaining him while a wants and warrants could be run while
his license was being held).
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an evidential basis, including the unconstitutional reasons of race, religion,
ethnicity, and gender.141
Most significantly, the Kansas Supreme Court held in 2019 that the Strieff
ruling was inapplicable because the arrest warrant discovery occurred after
not only the initial unconstitutional seizure, but after the officers had already
searched and seized the evidence at issue on appeal.142 This meant that the
search incident to arrest could not be based on having located the warrant,
and the assessment of its constitutionality without the warrant should have
lead the court to expressly conclude that the search prior to discovering the
warrant was an independent second violation of the accused’s constitutional
protection.143
Even under the Strieff facts, the Kansas Supreme Court found policy
reasons for avoiding the outcome of that case.144 The solution was to hold
the arrest, on a valid outstanding arrest warrant, even if discovered only
because of a totally unjustified seizure or search of the person, was
constitutional, as is the attendant search incident to that arrest.145 The court
held, however, that there was a separable constitutional issue of whether a
prosecution could be based not only on the warrant crime, but upon any
evidence found pursuant to an arrest based on the warrant when the warrant
and the arrest were solely the result of the initial suspicionless seizure.146
The court held that in applying the Attenuation Doctrine’s three-factor
protocol, flagrancy of the unconstitutional conduct in combination with
close temporal proximity could trump locating an arrest warrant in between
the unconstitutional seizure of the person or search, and the seizure of the
evidence at issue on appeal.147
The Idaho Supreme Court expressly distinguished Strieff by weighing
more heavily the concern that the police course of conduct was a purposeful
141. Weldon, 445 P.3d at 115. See supra note 17–18, 34–35 and accompanying text.
142. Sanders, 445 P.3d at 1157.
143. See id. at 1157–58 (holding a search after discovering an arrest warrant was also another
unconstitutional GIT because it exceeded the scope authorized by a search incident to an arrest); see
also id. (explaining why multiple independent unconstitutional searches or seizures should be an express
component of the definition of “flagrant”).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1157.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1158; see also State v. Bailey, 338 P.3d 702, 715 (Org. 2014) (“[T]he temporal proximity
between the unlawful detention and the discovery of the challenged evidence, outweighs any value the
otherwise might be assigned to the subsequent discovery of a valid arrest warrant.”); State v. Cohagan,
404 P.3d 659, 668 (Idaho 2017).
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circumvention of the law at a point in time when the officer was aware there
was no reason to even request that the accused turn over his identification
so the officer could run an arrest warrant inquiry.148
Thoroughly “vetting” all dimensions of police “flagrant” unconstitutional
course of conduct, as this Article recommends, should serve as the crucial
inquiry to fairly reconcile the interest implicated by the Fruits and the
Attenuation Doctrines.149
B. Attenuation—State Supreme Courts’ Decisions: Outcomes and Implications
Nine state supreme courts, in ten decisions, ultimately concluded that the
Fruits Doctrine should prevail because the Attenuation Doctrine did not
justify excusing exclusion.150
Fourteen state supreme courts, in seventeen decisions, ultimately
concluded that the Attenuation Doctrine justified excusing exclusion.151
It is important to note, that seven of these courts sided with application
of the Attenuation Doctrine in the arguably appropriate context that the
intervening act was the commission by the accused of a separate and distinct

148. Cohagan, 404 P.3d at 666.
149. See infra notes 192–210 and accompanying text (detailing this Article’s review of state
supreme court decisions surrounding the Fruits Doctrine and Attenuation Doctrine).
150. State v. Spencer, 848 A.2d 1183, 1198 (Conn. 2004); Cohagan, 404 P.3d at 664–66; Sanders,
445 P.3d at 1159; State v. Jefferson, 310 P.3d 331, 341 (Kan. 2013); Thornton v. State, 214 A.3d 34, 57
(Md. 2019); Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 121 N.E.3d 166, 178–79 (Mass. 2019); State v. Socci, 98 A.3d
474, 482–83 (N.H. 2014) finding in the record multiple indices of potential “Flagrant” misconduct in
seeking consent including threats to: arrest, remove children, and damage property, and elicitation of
consent by express reference to what was observed during course of an unconstitutional search); State
v. Chippero, 753 A.2d 701, 708–11 (N.J. 2000); State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1173 (N.M. 2015)
(discussing elicitation of consent by express reference to what was observed during course of an
unconstitutional search); Bailey, 338 P.3d at 714 (stating the purpose of the unconstitutional detention
of the accused was to run an arrest warrant check).
151. State v. Hummons, 253 P.3d 275, 279 (Ariz. 2011); People v. Tomaske, 440 P.3d 444,
448–49 (Colo. 2019); State v. Brunetti, 901 A.2d 1, 23–24 (Conn. 2006); State v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d
145, 155 (Conn. 2003); State v. Lane, 726 N.W. 371, 391–92 (Iowa 2007) (finding third party consent
qualified as an intervening event that justified application of the Attenuation Doctrine); People v.
Henderson, 989 N.E.2d 192, 201, 205 (Ill. 2013); King v. State, 76 A.3d 1035, 1044 (Md. 2013); State
v. Bray, 902 N.W.2d 98, 111–14 (Neb. 2017); In re Ashley W., 821 N.W.2d 706, 720 (Neb. 2012); State
v. McGurk, 958 A.2d 1005, 1010–11 (N.H. 2008); State v. Panarello, 949 A.2d 732, 736–37 (N.H.
2008); In re J.A., 186 A.3d 266, 277–78 (N.J. 2018); State v. Nelson, 356 P.3d 1113, 1120 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2015) (finding resisting arrest and obstruction of justice was an independent action); In re Jeremiah
W. 606 S.E.2d 766, 769 (S.C. 2004); State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 762–63 (Tenn. 2011); State v.
Jackson, 464 S.W.3d 724, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); State v. McEachin, 213 A.3d 1094, 1102 (Vt.
2019).
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crime, but two of these seven courts also held that the Attenuation Doctrine
excused exclusion outside of this context.152
The Maryland and New Jersey Supreme Courts made decisions landing
on both sides of the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines interests analyses
evaluations.153 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in its case which held
attenuation justified excusing exclusion, gave almost no significance to a
series of unconstitutional actions by the police, each succeeding
unconstitutional government investigative technique building on the
prior.154 Hence, an admittedly unconstitutional entry into the family home
of the accused juvenile was followed by an unconstitutional search of the
interior of the home by the police, which was followed by the
unconstitutional warrantless seizure and arrest of the accused, followed by
the unconstitutional handcuffing and movement of the accused to another
part of the home where he was visibly in custody as the other members of
the family returned home.155
Nevertheless, the majority of the Court reached the conclusion that the
accused’s brother’s decision to search for the stolen item in the company of
the police constituted consent, and as such, an independent intervening
event purging the taint of this series of unconstitutional GITs.156
V. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS—IMPLICATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Findings & Conclusions
1.

An Interest at Stake Assessment

Over the course of about a half century, SCOTUS has developed its
standards for assessing the interest implicated by the Fruits and Attenuation
Doctrines, and its work has significantly influenced how the state supreme
courts have addressed these doctrines.157 SCOTUS’ work can fairly be
152. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
153. See Chippero, 753 A.2d at 708–13 (applying the three-factor attenuation analysis, the court
concluded exclusion was justified); King, 76 A.3d at 1044 (following SCOTUS assessment that
attenuation trumped Fruits Doctrine); In re J.A., 186 A.3d 266, 277–78 (N.J. 2018) (finding attenuation
trumps fruits based on third party consent analysis); Thornton, 214 A.3d at 57 (holding Fruits Doctrine
requires exclusion and inadequate proof of attenuation to displace Fruits Doctrine).
154. In re J.A., 186 A.3d at 277–78.
155. Id. at 269.
156. Id. at 278.
157. See supra notes 16–59 and accompanying text.
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characterized as laying the foundation of infrastructure for evaluating each
doctrine and their relationship to each other.158 Opportunities, however,
were missed, first to employ—even when members of the Court
convincingly argued that it should—these doctrines, and the interest
implicated therein, as the basis of decision.159
Second, lost was the opportunity to center the development of the
standards defining these doctrines and their purpose on a consistent interest
analysis, rather than colorful but potentially subjective phrases, unlikely to
direct lawyers or judges to consistently focus on the interest in play.160
Hence the rights of the people were assessed without reference to the
significance that these doctrines were developed frequently in factual
narratives in which government agents violated the constitutional rights of
minority men.161 Nor has SCOTUS’ work on these doctrines given
appropriate and consistent recognition to the lack of any significant
government interest at play at the time when its agents initiated and
perpetuated a course of conduct that enmeshed these men in the criminal
justice system due to the violation of their national constitutional rights, and
thereby the rights of all Americans.162 The Court condemned such conduct
in several cases, but did so without relying on the conclusion warranted by
the facts in the record—that the government had no real interest at stake
when it violated the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment rights of its
citizens.163
Nor was its condemnation of the government’s unconstitutional conduct
strong, clear, and consistent; although during the period of this study it did
identify the threat of systemic intentional governmental unconstitutional
conduct as one of its reasons for finding exclusion was the appropriate
remedy.164 In its most recent important decision assessing the interest
implicated by these doctrines, the Court endorsed major indices of a police
state, and this time a majority man’s constitutional rights were injured.165

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See supra notes 16–59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 48–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26, 42–59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18, 29, 34–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42–47, 129–149 and accompanying text.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42–47, 129–131 and accompanying text.
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Allocation of the Burden of Proof

This Article identified as an important preliminary procedural issue, the
allocation of burdens of proof with respect to an accused qualifying for the
right claimed, and thereafter, if the person qualifies, the determination of
whether that right was violated.166 This Article found that the Court has
allocated to the accused the burden of proving they qualified for the right,
and thereafter allocating the burden of persuasion to the prosecution to
prove that its course of conduct did not violate the accused’s right.167
Allocation of the burdens of proof was not an issue consistently and
expressly addressed in the important Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines
decisions of the Court. When this issue was evaluated, the Court appears to
get right the policy and interest analysis implications of allocating the
burdens of production and persuasion on these doctrines: by allocating the
burden of persuasion to the government to prove that the unconstitutional
government investigatory technique was not the probable cause of the
government’s securing the evidence at issue, and if it was, why the facts and
the government’s interest they implicate nevertheless justify excusing
exclusion.168 To the degree the SCOTUS decisions constitutionally require
the allocation of the burden of persuasion to the government, the state
supreme courts are bound to also allocate the burden of persuasion to the
government with respect to these doctrines. This Article found that a
majority of the state supreme courts expressly evaluating the issue of
allocating the burden of proof with respect to these doctrines during the
period of the study did allocate the burden of persuasion to the
government.169
However, this Article found that a few state supreme courts, including
Maryland’s high court, which in previous decisions allocated the burden of
persuasion to the government, unconstitutionally switched the burden of
persuasion to the accused with respect to one or more of these burden of
persuasion issues.170 There was a finding that poor policy choices,
including failing to give sufficient attention to the interest implications of
forcing the accused to prove that the Fruits Doctrine applied or the

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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Attenuation Doctrine did not, accounted to some degree for this minority
viewpoint.171
3.

The Fruits Doctrine

The first important finding from this study of the state supreme courts’
analysis and application of the Fruits Doctrine (2000–2020) is the term
“primary taint” should be and can be more precisely defined. A more
precise definition would better structure the interest analysis to properly
account for what is at stake in determining whether requiring exclusion is
justified. To achieve this improved conceptual approach to the interest
analysis, the definition of “primary taint” should begin by identifying the
initial unconstitutional GIT.172 Once identified, the initial taint should be
tracked to determine if thereafter, there were additional unconstitutional
GIT(s) that were independent of the initial taint (i.e., involving a recognized
distinct GIT that was not inevitably the result of the initial taint).173 The
unconstitutional course of conduct present in the facts of Wong Sun and
Brown provide good examples of such subsequent independent
unconstitutional GITs.174 As those cases and some state supreme courts
held, “but for causation” is not enough to justify the application of the Fruits
Doctrine.175 The reciprocal and balancing approach of the interest
principle identified and discussed herein is that but for causation between
the initial unconstitutional GIT and subsequent unconstitutional GITs is
not enough to disqualify those subsequent GITs from constituting
additional components of the primary taint.
The most important finding of this study of the state supreme courts’
interest analysis of the Fruits Doctrines, with respect to the most important
hypothesis of this study concerning that doctrine, was that a substantial
majority of the state supreme courts (twenty of twenty-seven), when focused
on evaluating the merits of applying the Fruits Doctrine, were led by that
analysis to conclude that the doctrine required exclusion.176 This study also
found that state supreme courts, which base their Fruits and Attenuation
evaluations on their state constitution rather than the national Constitution
as interpreted by SCOTUS, are more likely to conclude that the Fruits
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16–21, 34, 35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26–28, 37 and accompanying text.
See supra text at the beginning of Part 3, note 104 and accompanying text.
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Doctrine applies and requires exclusion.177 This result is even more likely
when a state supreme court decides to broaden the scope of the right at
issue or broaden the policy justification for exclusion beyond achieving the
goal of deterrence of government misconduct.178
Most significantly, this study found evidence that state supreme courts
are even more likely to require exclusion if the court expressly takes the
stance that an issue implicating constitutional protections guaranteed under
the state’s constitution are possibly more protective of criminal defendants
than the protections provided by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
of the national Constitution, and should be considered first, if applicable,
thereby eliminating the need to assess the application of the parallel national
Constitution’s provision.179 These findings support the conclusion that
confirms a major hypothesis of this Article. The state supreme courts over
the last two decades have demonstrated an ability to conduct principled
interest analysis of the Fruits Doctrine, and they have frequently departed
from the more limited protection afforded by SCOTUS’ assessment of the
interest at stake.180
The implication of this stance by these courts is significant for the future
of striking the appropriate federalism balance between state supreme courts
and SCOTUS on these issues. No matter the composition of SCOTUS, and
the resulting interest analysis conducted by the Court, the state supreme
courts are authorized by our federal dual constitutional system to conduct
their own identification and evaluation of the interest implicated by the
Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines.
4.

The Attenuation Doctrine

This study’s second major hypothesis was that state supreme courts will
make policy assessments which will favor finding that the Attenuation
Doctrine does not trump the Fruits Doctrine, and therefore, exclusion is
still justified. The study found that when these courts focused on the
Attenuation Doctrine, even if they referenced the Fruits Doctrine, often
omitted assessment of the Fruits Doctrine before moving directly to
determining if the Attenuation Doctrine justifies excusing exclusion.181
These decisions reflected an analytic protocol that once attenuation is raised
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97–100, 105–08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text.
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by the prosecution, the Fruits evaluation merges with the Attenuation
evaluation.182
This merger provides a great opportunity for reform of the evaluation
and reconciliation of the interest implicated by these doctrines, an
implication leading to a key recommendation discussed in Section Two of
this final part.183
This study found that the conceptual decision to merge the evaluation of
the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines cuts both ways with respect to careful
assessment of the interest at stake when deciding whether attenuation
should be found, and therefore, exclusion excused.184 The most important
finding was that by the omission of focusing first on an evaluation of the
Fruits Doctrine, these state supreme courts consciously or unconsciously
heightened the significance of the assessment of the government’s claim for
excusing exclusion, and that this focus risked undervaluing the accused’s
claim concerning the quantity and quality of the unconstitutional
government conduct that could be found in the record on appeal which
could have served as the basis for a state supreme court concluding that the
Fruits Doctrine should prevail over the government’s attenuation claim.185
This study concluded that the decision to skip an evaluation focusing first
on a Fruits Doctrine assessment and instead focusing on the Attenuation
Doctrine, could possibly prove outcome determinative, unless the
attenuation assessment consistently included a quality evaluation of the
interest of the accused reflected in the Fruits Doctrine.186
This study found that there is a consensus among the state supreme
courts, tracking the approach first adopted by SCOTUS, of what the
components are for evaluating an Attenuation Doctrine claim by the
government, and that those components, given their amorphous nature and
their sequencing, risk inconsistent and subjective decision-making.187 This
risk was framed by the differences in the interest analysis undertaken by
these courts in determining whether the Attenuation Doctrine should
excuse exclusion.188 This study found that at least seven state supreme
courts who focused their interest evaluation on the intervening conduct
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 206–227 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See supra note 113 and accompanying and immediately following text.
See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125–149 and accompanying text.
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component of the Attenuation Doctrine held that when the record on
appeal included evidence that the accused had committed a separate crime
in reaction to the government’s unconstitutional conduct that the crime was
per se intervening conduct that justified excusing exclusion.189 This study
found, however, that the Maryland Court of Appeals in 2019, rejected the
per se approach, and held that the separate crime finding did not justify
failing to evaluate the interest protected by determining the flagrancy of the
government’s course of unconstitutional conduct, or the relationship
between that unconstitutional conduct, the time interval between it, and the
occurrence of the separate crime.190 This decision is more consistent with
the Attenuation Doctrine’s analytic protocol which calls presumptively for
at least an assessment of all three interest implicating factors. But even more
importantly, the difference in outcomes in this reoccurring fact pattern
illustrates how the protocol, as crafted and employed by the nation’s highest
courts, inherently risk subjectivity in decision-making.
The second pattern of decisions is the state supreme courts’ reaction to
the facts found in the record in the decision of SCOTUS in the Strieff
case.191 This study found that most state supreme courts considering this
fact pattern, which involves the government engaging in at least one
unconstitutional GIT, despite the fact that at the time the government
possessed no facts which gave it an interest, held in contrast to the SCOTUS
holding in Strieff, that exclusion was required.192 Notably, this study found
that the handful of state supreme courts assessing based on their state
constitution, the appropriate reconciliation of the interest at stake in the
Strieff facts after that decision, have rejected the SCOTUS evaluation and
decision and held that the post hoc discovery of a warrant provided a
government interest that could be accommodated in a much fairer
fashion.193
This study found that the Hawaii, Idaho, and Kansas Supreme Courts,
post-Strieff, took on the interest analysis and outcome of that case head on,
and rejected its interest evaluation and reconciliation for multiple and
distinct reasons.194 The Hawaii Supreme Court focused on the lack of the
government’s interest at the outset of an “encounter” between government
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129–149 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137–149 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138–149 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141–49 and accompanying text.
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agents and citizens, and essentially held that the government lacked a real
interest in seeking to investigate people for no reason other than the
subjective suspicion of the officer which may be motivated by multiple
issues the agent may have, including racial, ethnic, and gender prejudice.195
The Idaho Supreme Court’s holding focused on the unjustified,
unconstitutional course of conduct by the government and found it
flagrant.196 The Kansas Supreme Court was more thorough in its interest
evaluation and reconciliation, and rejected Strieff at multiple levels and for
multiple reasons, producing a significantly fairer interest
accommodation.197
This study found that overall, during the twenty year period of this study,
fourteen of the twenty-three state supreme courts identified herein, when
focusing their evaluations on the Attenuation Doctrine, held that the
Doctrine trumped the Fruits Doctrine and justified excusing exclusion.198
This outcome’s alignment is modestly contrary to this Article’s second major
hypothesis, that state supreme courts would protect the interest of the
people reflected in the claims of the accused, which reached these state
supreme courts, by holding that the government’s attenuation claim did not
justify excusing exclusion.199
The outcome alignment, however, does not tell the whole story. First,
because the outcome alignment is consistent with the conceptual approach,
most of these courts took to analyzing the interest implicated by the Fruits
and Attenuation Doctrines by merging those evaluations and featuring the
Attenuation Doctrine.200 Second, most of this difference in the alignment
of state court decisions, focusing upon the Attenuation Doctrine, can be
attributed to an outlier interest analysis fact pattern: the finding of the
commission of an independent crime by the accused, which served as the
intervening factor that justifies excusing exclusion.201 Two state supreme
courts made decisions on both sides of the ledger.202
This study found that federalism policies play, and should play, a
significant role in accounting for the outcome differential in these cases,
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
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especially once the interest assessment of the two doctrines is merged.
Policies that include (a) the willingness of a state supreme court, at a
particular point in time, to rely on its state constitution; (b) the breadth of
the policies the court envisions are implicated by its constitution; (c) the
degree to which the state supreme court is willing to view its constitution as
an independent basis for deciding the case; and (d) the order in which a state
supreme court is willing to consider its state versus the national Constitution
as the basis for its decision.203
This split in the outcomes in the state supreme courts, in evaluating and
applying the Attenuation Doctrine, is circumstantial evidence of the difficult
task these courts face when employing the current widely accepted
attenuation tripartite protocol—to identify, assess, and reconcile the interest
implicated by the Attenuation Doctrine—when the Attenuation Doctrine
surrogates for both it and the Fruits Doctrine.204
This study documented the risk that subjective and possibly socially and
legally impermissible considerations, such as race and class, could have
played a role based on the facts in the record before the court on appeal.205
Section 2 of the final part of this Article focuses upon a recommendation
and its implications for leveling the interest analysis playing field when state
supreme courts take on the challenge of reconciling the competing interest
underlying the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines.
B. Implications and Recommendations
In the long run, state supreme courts’ principled constitutional decisionmaking would be better served first if no state adopted (and the states that
have adopted abandon) the “interstitial approach” to determining the core
federalism issue of whether to apply the state or the federal Constitution
first.206
Assessing the state constitution first furthers the development of in-depth
and principled interest analysis as the basis for determining whether the
Fruits Doctrine justifies exclusion, or the Attenuation Doctrine excuses it.
Applying the state constitution first achieves these valued constitutional
federalism goals because the decisions collectively can inform and enhance
the evaluation each subsequent state supreme court is capable of making.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra notes 96–100, and 137–148 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45, 120, 160, and 186 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18, 89, 127, 133–34, 141 and accompanying text.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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This Article’s recommendation regarding “flagrancy” demonstrates how a
much more robust development of principled state constitutional
evaluations of the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines’ interest implication can
be accomplished, and the potential benefits it could produce for the country.
The state supreme courts would be better served if the Fruits and
Attenuation Doctrines evaluation protocol were merged, and focused first,
and presumptively primarily, on only one factual inquiry; whether the record
on appeal evidenced that the government engaged in flagrant
unconstitutional conduct. If the record demonstrates it did, maximum
deterrence is required, and evidence of temporal proximity and intervening
events or conduct should be subordinated to achieving that much-needed
deterrence, so long as that flagrant course of government misconduct was a
“probable cause” of the government’s securing the evidence at issue.
“Probable cause” is a term of art whose definition has been developed over
a lengthy course of time to determine if the government was justified in
engaging in certain GIT that would otherwise violate search and seizure
protections.207 If that definition of probable cause is borrowed to
determine the degree to which the government’s flagrant unconstitutional
course of conduct was the cause of the government securing the evidence
at issue, it could well produce a fair interest balancing; every time probable
cause was found to justify the government’s conduct in the search and
seizure context, it would serve to define a sufficient causal connection
between the flagrant government conduct and the seizure of the evidence
at issue on appeal. This conceptual reciprocity would also heighten the
likelihood of objective decision-making because of this reciprocal
relationship and the scores of precedent that can be employed to help with
the definition.
SCOTUS, most state supreme courts, and commentators agree the
flagrancy of the government’s unconstitutional course of conduct should be
the most significant factor in determining the need to deter police

207. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATIVE (11th ed. 2018), 132−149 (tracking SCOTUS decisions defining probable cause, as
well as the interpretation of state and federal courts of the definition of probable cause; authors
conclude that the standard developed in the decisions is properly characterized as a “fair probability”);
Dannye Holley, The Decline of the Right to Privacy and Security: Gates and the States—The First Three Years,
21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 823, 857–58 (1988) (criticizing the definition of probable cause in the
SCOTUS Gates decision, and identifying the interest at stake, which should guide defining probable
cause to reflect a reasonable accommodation of those interest).
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misconduct by excluding the evidence at issue.208 Even state supreme
courts, in finding attenuation to excuse exclusion, have endorsed the
primacy of the flagrancy of government misconduct in determining if the
contested evidence should be excluded.209
When the government’s course of conduct does not involve flagrantly
unconstitutional conduct, which is a probable cause of the seizure of the
evidence at issue, two alternative interest analysis courses of evaluation are
worthy of consideration. The first is to employ a per se or presumptive
policy that exclusion is not justified. This option has the value of reducing
the risk of race and other irrelevant factors playing at least an unconscious
role in law enforcement agents, prosecutors, and lower courts’ decisionmaking. These influences are not readily detected at the state supreme court
level. This option is also likely to reduce the risk of inconsistent decisionmaking and enhance the likelihood of objective, neutral decision-making,
provided of course that the flagrancy evaluation was robust and
principled—centered on the multiple objective facets of that concept,
including those identified herein.
The second policy option to consider if the course of government agent
conduct involves unconstitutional, but not flagrantly unconstitutional
conduct, is to thereafter require evaluation to determine the temporal
proximity between the unconstitutional GIT and the securing of the
evidence at issue. The evaluation would also consider whether there were
intervening events and conduct of the accused and the government
pertinent to determining if the unconstitutional, but not flagrant,
government course of conduct was a probable cause of the government’s
obtaining the evidence at issue on appeal. This second option is more
complex, and therefore, risks the likelihood of more inconsistent and
subjective decision-making. On the other hand, this second option
increases the probability of a higher quality interest identification,
assessment, and reconciliation that lower courts, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers from the jurisdiction can track, and in which sister state supreme
courts may consider. For example, when there is no significant time interval
between the unconstitutional GIT and the securing of the evidence in
question, but the accused commits an independent crime after that GIT, the
208. See supra notes 56, 128, 147–48 and accompanying text.
209. Cox v. State, 28 A.3d 687, 701–02 (Md. 2011); State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 762 (Tenn.
2011); State v. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d 724, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (finding, once the court decides
there is a significant intervening factor, the temporal proximity factor’s significance decreases, and the
flagrancy of the officer’s unconstitutional GIT increases).
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decision to excuse exclusion is only presumptively justified; those studying
the opinion can track the more nuanced assessment the Maryland Court of
Appeals employed and this Article documented.
For this revised interest analysis-based conceptual protocol to work, there
must be a robust definition of flagrant, which has a strong potential for
objective and consistent race, gender, and caste neutral state supreme court
application.
Several of the SCOTUS decisions evaluated in Part One included a
course of government conduct that includes unconstitutional actions that
illustrate and can be employed to help build a robust and principled
definition of flagrant.210 A flagrant unconstitutional GIT is one, which
when undertaken, the government had no interest in pursuing because there
were no facts present at the time that justified the government violating
rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments of the national
Constitution or its state constitution equivalents.211 An important aspect
of this assessment, needed to focus the evaluation on objectively
determinable facts, is that the government agent’s subjective beliefs about
the constitutionality of his conduct should play no role.
The facts of Wong Sun, Brown, and the Strieff cases all presented such an
unjustified government course of conduct, but only the Strieff majority
turned a blind eye and deaf ear to the magnitude of the government’s
misconduct.212 The government accosted a majority man on the street,
bereft of any objective evidence but ripe with subjective suspicion.213 The
pedestrian was accosted; an unconstitutional demand made that the person
talk to the government agent; an unconstitutional demand thereafter made
that the citizen turn over his identification; an unconstitutional seizure made
of the citizen, ordering him to wait while the identification is used to
determine if the citizen had an arrest warrant.214 No government interest
justified this sequential course of unconstitutional conduct, until after the
fact the government got lucky, and an arrest warrant of any ilk was found to
exist.215

210. See supra text proceeding and accompanying notes 26–29; see also supra notes 33–35, 40–41,
45–46, 55–56.
211. See supra notes 19–21, 33–35, 42–45 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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During the period of this study, 2000–2020, state courts of last resort
were more likely than SCOTUS to apply the Fruits Doctrine or refuse to
find that attenuation justified excusing exclusion when the record
demonstrated that the government violated an accused’s constitutional
rights, and that violation commenced at a point in time when the
government had no evidence to justify its interest in engaging in the
unconstitutional GIT.216 These state courts of last resort were even more
likely to apply the Fruits Doctrine or refuse to find that attenuation justified
excusing exclusion when the record on appeal included indisputable
evidence of another dimension of flagrant unconstitutional conduct;
multiple, distinct suspicionless and sequential suspicionless GITs.217 There
are state supreme court decisions discussed in this study where the record
reflected multiple and sequential unconstitutional GITs whether or not the
court acknowledged, or the defense expressly argued, the significance of
such government conduct.218
The fact that these unconstitutional GITs were done without any
justification requires exclusion of the evidence at issue on appeal, and the
government is held per se to know of the absence of any viable evidence;
culpability becomes an added dimension, and never an excuse, of this
component of a robust definition of flagrant.219 A related component of a
principled and robust definition of flagrant was identified in cases discussed
in this study; the court based its decision, at least in part, on holding the
government agents, who engaged in the unconstitutional conduct, to know
the current law, including Miranda requirements, and the state supreme
courts’ interpretations of the definition of the crime relied upon by the
government to engage in the investigatory technique(s) at issue on
appeal.220 This element of flagrant is likely to encourage government law
216. See supra notes 83, 87–89, 137–148 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 143, 173–75 and accompanying text.
218. State v. Bray, 902 N.W.2d 98, 111–14 (Neb. 2017); In re Ashley W., 821 N.W.2d 706, 712
(Neb. 2012) (discussing an illegal stop, followed by an illegal frisk); State v. Blesdell-Moore, 91 A.3d
619, 622 (N.H. 2014) (finding, after unconstitutionally failing to terminate a vehicle stop, an officer
next unconstitutionally executed a consent frisk of the driver by retrieving wads of money that he knew
weren’t weapons); State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Mo. 2011) (finding an unconstitutional stop
of a vehicle, followed by an unconstitutional seizure of the driver by detaining him while a wants and
warrants check could be run while his license was being held).
219. See supra notes 42, 136, and 148 and accompanying text.
220. State v. O’Neill, 936 A.2d 438, 454–58 (N.J. 2007) (stating all police must know Miranda
and its requirements); State v. Tenold, 937 N.W.2d 6, 11 (S.D. 2019) (discussing interpretations by the
state supreme court).
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enforcement agencies to increase the quality of training law enforcement
agents receive, as well as fortifying training regimes and resources, all of
which can serve as objective sources for evaluating the presence of this
component of flagrant.221
A state supreme court fleshed out the ignorance of the law “culpability”
level of government agents that meets the threshold for finding the police
conduct flagrant under this component of the definition of that term. The
Kansas Supreme Court has recently held that the record on appeal
demonstrated the government agents involved in the unconstitutional
conduct were at least grossly negligent in believing their conduct was
constitutional, or that their conduct reflected “recurring or systemic
negligence” by the police department’s members.222 The decision
suggested, and other decisions discussed in this Article identified, systemic
government unconstitutional conduct fairly characterized as sanctioned or
tolerated by the governmental agency. Such conduct poses the threat that
the government could, and likely planned, to resort to this same
unconstitutional GIT(s) repeatedly, as a fourth facet of a principled
definition of flagrant.223
State supreme courts, to deter the replication of such a course of lawless
government conduct, should exclude effects seized and statements made
following such course of institutional, systemic unconstitutional conduct,
while giving little or no weight to an evaluation of the temporal time interval,
or whether there were intervening events and conduct. If exclusion is the
punishment, it would provide maximum, justified deterrence and a great
incentive for the government to cease this course of conduct.224
Governments are in the best position to take preventative action to mitigate
or eliminate systemic, unconstitutional conduct.
The government’s unjustified invasion of a person’s constitutional rights
also implicates a fifth dimension of flagrant unconstitutional government
investigatory techniques; although rarely recognized by advocates or courts,
the fear and humiliation inflicted upon the innocent, as well as those
subsequently prosecuted, risks emotional distress by subjecting the people

221. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
222. State v. Tatro, 445 P.3d 173, 178 (Kan. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 144 (2009)).
223. See supra notes 40–41, 55 and accompanying text; and infra notes 227–29 and accompanying
text.
224. See supra notes 55 and accompanying text; and infra notes 227–29 and accompanying text.
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to invasion of their constitutional rights without justification.225
Encouraging lawyers on both sides and the lower courts to pay attention to
facts documenting such emotional distress, will likely raise awareness and
encourage preventative action that reduces such conduct, thereby
eliminating fears that race, gender, ethnicity, and other irrelevant
characteristics are the reason the government agents embarked on this
lawless course of conduct.
Several of the SCOTUS decisions evaluated in Part One included a
course of government conduct including multiple unconstitutional actions
that targeted minority males, and therefore, illustrated and can be employed
to build a robust and principled definition of flagrant.226
Excluding evidence seized as a result of flagrantly unconstitutional
government conduct, will provide significant incentive for the government
to redouble efforts to deter such conduct by its agents and have the likely
societally significant collateral benefit of reducing the risk of violence against
government agents, as well as the persons whose rights were violated. For
example, multiple components of this multi-faceted definition of flagrant
are implicated when the police go to a home of a third party with an arrest
warrant, but fail to secure a constitutionally required search warrant as well,
proceed to search the home ostensibly for the arrestee, and then repeat that
same unconstitutional GIT approximately a month later.227
C. Postscript—Implications for the Independent Source and Inevitable Discovery
Doctrines
There are two other doctrines courts have developed to justify excusing
exclusion as an exception to the application of the Fruits Doctrine: the
“Independent Source” and “Inevitable Discovery” Doctrines. State
supreme courts, during the study period of this Article, 2000–2020, in the
context of determining if the Fruits Doctrine should require exclusion,
evaluated if these doctrines justified excusing exclusion. Because of the
analysis and conclusions in this Article, these cases were reserved for
evaluation until this final section.
They were reserved because once the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrine
evaluations are merged, and focused solely on the issue of the flagrancy of
the government’s unconstitutional course of conduct, the Independent
225. See supra text discussion following note 29.
226. See supra notes 17, 18, 29, 33 and accompanying text.
227. State v. Poulton, 179 P.3d 1145, 1149 (Kan. 2008).
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Source Doctrine—when factually supported by the record on appeal—
escapes the focus on flagrancy because, by definition, that course of conduct
was not a probable cause of the obtaining of the evidence at issue on appeal.
The flagrant misconduct may, however, constitute the appropriate basis for
a civil claim, or as strong evidence of the need for systemic reform of the
government’s investigatory techniques, which, considering the American
culture in 2020, there is strong reason not to ignore by legislatures. If there
was no probable-cause nexus, then there is no need for an exception in the
form of an Independent Source Doctrine because a Fruits Doctrine
evaluation should conclude that exclusion is not justified.
The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine, on the other hand, provides no policy
reason for excusing from exclusion any evidence at issue which was seized
as a probable result of flagrant government unconstitutional conduct. When
that conduct is the probable cause of the government’s acquisition of the
evidence at issue, there is the strongest justification for excluding that
evidence to encourage deterrence. The fact that the government may have,
by some other investigatory techniques, seized the evidence at issue at some
other later point in time, in no way ameliorates the government’s flagrant
unconstitutional conduct and the harm it has caused the individual, the
government, or the safety and other interests of American society.
Restating this balancing inquiry in the form of the following hypothesis:
are the Independent Source and Inevitable Discovery Doctrines, grounded
on interests sufficiently distinct to justify exempting them from the
outcomes that result from the application of the Fruits and Attenuation
Doctrines’ interest analysis, when that analysis is focused on the flagrancy
of the government’s unconstitutional course of conduct? This hypothesis
is tested by examining the decisions of the state supreme courts who
invoked these doctrines, in the context of a Fruits Doctrine assessment, to
determine if they reflect a per se elimination of the accommodation and
protection of the interest of the people implicated by the most flagrant
police unconstitutional investigative techniques.
Hence the evaluation of the fairness of the interest reconciliation
reflected in these doctrines had to be postponed until the multi-faceted
definition of flagrant was developed during this Article.228 A Maryland
Court of Appeals decision within the study period illustrates a court whose
holding and reasoning is consistent with the proposal made herein for
evaluating the role the Independent Source and Inevitable Discovery
228. See supra notes 206–227 and accompanying text.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

49

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

50

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1

Doctrines should play in determining if exclusion of the evidence at issue
should be excused.229 The court held that neither doctrine justified
excusing exclusion when the Independent Source Doctrine was inapplicable
because the police conduct constituted flagrant violations of the
Constitution’s knock and announce requirement, which were but for causes
of the subsequent seizure of the contraband.230
The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine was applicable, but the court rejected
its use to excuse exclusion because the court recognized to employ the
doctrine to excuse exclusion under the facts of the case would open the door
to repeat violations of the knock and announce protection.231
Other state supreme courts, however, employed the Inevitable Discovery
Doctrine to excuse exclusion without recognizing either the highly
subjective nature of the doctrine, and that they were possibly ignoring
interests of the accused that are potentially accommodated by the
appropriate reconciliation of the competing interest reflected in the Fruits
and Attenuation Doctrines.232 The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine when
applied, no matter how unjustified, intrusive, and humiliating the
unconstitutional GIT, would unfairly excuse exclusion. For example, a state
supreme court relying on the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine unwittingly
reinstated a murder scene exception to the exclusionary rule after
acknowledging that the per se adoption of this exception was rejected by
SCOTUS.233 This position was taken by the court, despite the fact that
police are held to know and follow SCOTUS precedent.234 The court relied
on the fact that government agents had viewed the crime scene from outside
the room before unconstitutionally entering, and thereafter, eventually
searching the room and seizing the effects therein without having first
secured a search warrant.235
The Missouri Supreme Court recognized the danger of considering the
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine to excuse exclusion once a court has
reconciled the Fruits versus the Attenuation Doctrine in favor of exclusion,
primarily because of the flagrancy of the government’s unconstitutional
229. State v. Lee, 821 A.2d 922, 939–941 (Md. 2003).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Roy v. State, 62 A.3d 1183, 1190 (Del. 2012); Teal v. State, 647 S.E.2d 15, 21–22 (Ga.
2007); State v. Newcomb, 679 S.E.2d 675, 697–98 (W. Va. 2009).
233. Teal, 647 S.E.2d at 20, 22.
234. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
235. Teal, 647 S.E.2d at 22.
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course of conduct.236 The same court, however, along with the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, also appropriately applied the
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine to excuse exclusion.237 In the Oliver case,
there was an unconstitutional seizure of the accused’s effects done under
circumstances which did not implicate any of the components of the multidimensional definition of flagrant developed in this Article.238
The South Dakota Supreme Court did demonstrate the interests
implicated by the Primary Taint, Fruits, Attenuation, Independent Source,
and Inevitable Discovery Doctrines can be duly noted and fairly
reconciled.239 The court’s core, correct point was that the Independent
Source Doctrine is the appropriate basis for resolution, rather than the
Fruits Doctrine, when the GIT that led to the seizure of the evidence at
issue was totally independent of the primary unconstitutional GIT and its
fruits.240 This rule is not only an appropriate accommodation of the
interest identified in these competing doctrines, it is also capable of being
objectively applied, even if it is further qualified by giving the government
the opportunity to prove that the evidence it possessed at the time of the
GIT at issue was sufficient alone to satisfy the applicable constitutional
standards, and after striking any evidence whose source was an
unconstitutional, but not necessarily flagrantly unconstitutional, course of
government conduct.241
The lower court in the West Virginia decision found a way, that the
Supreme Court of Appeals let stand, to accommodate the competing
interest in the context of a Miranda violation as the unconstitutional
government conduct.242 The court ruled that the government could not
introduce the tainted inculpatory, in-custody statement made by the accused
without Miranda warnings to prove guilt, but that the weapon that would
have been easily discovered by the scope of the constitutional search that
would have been undertaken for it, could be used to prove guilt.243

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 150–51 (Mo. 2011).
State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Mo. 2009); Newcomb, 679 S.E.2d at 697–98.
Oliver, 293 S.W.3d at 443; Newcomb, 679 S.E.2d at 697–98.
State v. Boll, 651 N.W.2d 710, 717–18 (S.D. 2002).
Id. at 717 n.6.
Id. at 718–20.
Newcomb, 679 S.E.2d at 697–98.
Id.
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D. Reflections and Perspectives
Finally, this final subsection of Part Five provides overall perspectives to
be drawn from the Article, including how its major proposal might impact
the significance of the Independent Source and its hypothetical iteration, the
Inevitable Discovery Doctrines.
1.

Constitutional Federalism

First, this Article advocates for a more robust interest analysis focused on
judicial federalism by state supreme courts asserting their inherent
federalism authority to make their own interest assessment of the competing
interests implicated by the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines. This Article
has suggested, and expressly recommends, that this better form of
federalism would be maximized if a critical mass of the state supreme courts
would follow the current example set by a few state supreme courts. The
state supreme courts should adopt the approach of first applying the Fruits
Doctrine and the provisions of their state constitution to assess the interest
implicated by the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines to determine if the
record demonstrates flagrant unconstitutional government conduct.
If flagrant unconstitutional conduct is found, exclusion is required under
the state constitution. Such an appropriate federalism interest evaluationbased assessment would encourage litigants to rely heavily on their state
constitution, before any consideration of the national Constitution, in
evaluating the interest in play generally, and in particular, in the Fruits and
Attenuation Doctrines cases. Multiple state supreme courts’ decisions
focused on their justices’ independent interest assessment would help these
courts pool, and thus, improve the quality of their evaluations, as well as
serve as a possible valuable counterpoint to the interest analysis reflected in
contemporaneous SCOTUS Fruits and Attenuation cases. The interest
analysis evaluations found in the state supreme courts’ decisions over the
first two decades of this century, identified and discussed in this study, could
serve at least as a starting point for such evaluations.244 The implication of
this stance by these courts is significant for the future of striking the
appropriate federalism balance between state supreme courts and SCOTUS
on these issues. No matter the composition of SCOTUS, and the resulting
interest analysis conducted by that Court, the state supreme courts are
authorized by our federal dual constitutional system to conduct their own
244. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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identification and evaluation of the interest implicated by the Fruits and
Attenuation Doctrines.
2.

The Fruits–Attenuation Doctrines

First, this Article recommends the express merger of the analysis of the
two doctrines as the first major step to reducing inconsistent and subjective
decision-making. The future analysis should begin by the state supreme
court reviewing, in the first case that comes before it which presents these
issues, the courts decisions it characterized primarily as Fruits Doctrine
cases, and those the court primarily characterized as Attenuation Doctrine
cases. The review with a focus on flagrancy of the government’s course of
unconstitutional conduct should produce first a more precise definition of
“primary taint.” This process would serve as an important initial step in
getting the interest identification, evaluation, and reconciliation implicated
by the Fruits and Attenuation Doctrines correct.
In the context of that merged evaluation, the flagrancy assessment would
proceed to determine if there were other independent unconstitutional
GITs. Focusing solely on the objective components of flagrancy, identified
herein, is likely to enhance the quality of the decision-making, including
reducing inconsistent and subjective decision-making.
In the Strieff fact patterns, for example, the interest accommodation that
should result would hold that the government could prosecute, and possibly
convict, for the crime for which the valid warrant was issued. The
government, however, should not prosecute, and the trier of fact would not
convict, for the crime that is based upon the government’s course of flagrant
unconstitutional conduct. In both situations the outcomes are consistent
with the focus on the flagrancy of the government’s unconstitutional course
of conduct and whether it was the probable cause of the searches and
seizures that were the basis for the prosecution.
Probable cause provides a more familiar proof standard for determining
when flagrantly unconstitutional GITs justify exclusion without the need for
an independent evaluation of temporal proximity or intervening events or
conduct. Probable cause, which satisfies the government’s proof burden, is
the same level of causal connection which would justify excluding evidence
on behalf of the accused subjected to flagrant unconstitutional government
conduct.
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